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 This thesis is about the institutional logics in the Singapore state and in 
politics. I look at the historical developments of the institutional orders in the 
Singapore state. They are: the economy, the military, the politics - in particular the 
People's Action Party, and the state bureaucracy. I argue that the military-security 
logic is dominant owing to the emphasis on physical vulnerability especially during 
the years immediately after independence. The keen sense of vulnerability was felt by 
the initial generation of political leaders and bureaucrats, and this has been 
institutionalised. This thesis investigates one avenue of its manifestation, through the 
executive successions in the state bureaucracy and in politics.  
 I look at both new institutionalism and institutional logics. I suggest that the 
new institutionalism was inappropriate for this thesis, owing to the lack of 
isomorphism observed amongst the different agencies. I find institutional logics more 
appropriate, given the presence of multiple orders influencing the state bureaucracy 
and politics. I modify the set of institutional logics. In place of the democratic logic, I 
use a more expansive, "political" label. I add the military-security logic here to 
acknowledge the importance of the military in the state.  
 I outline how Singapore is not an exception in Asia when it comes to the 
dominance of the military in the state. I do this through the examples of South Korea 
and Taiwan.  
 Using executive succession as a technique, I make arguments about how 
important state agencies are influenced by the military-security logic. I describe how 
military officers are routinely rotated to civilian postings in the state bureaucracy. I 




the military-security logic. Nonetheless, the economic and professional logics still 
exist. I also showed how a political logic exists in the state bureaucracy, where 
permanent secretaries and principal private secretaries leave the public service and 
become politicians.  
 The availability of long-time bureaucrats further reinforces the dominance of 
the military-security logic. The issue is not one of quantity, but one of kind. It is not 
that there is a shortage of people who are able to serve as heads of state agencies, but 
that the issue could be one of preference.  
 I show how the restructuring and creation of new agencies further reinforce 
the evidence for the dominance of the military-security logic. When new 
organisations are created, members representing the military-security logic often 
become the heads of the restructured or created agencies.   
 This thesis makes contributions to several areas of literature. This thesis is an 
instance of the application of the institutional logics framework. The modifications 
here to the political logic and the addition of the military order should allow the 
framework to be applicable to a wider variety of territories and histories. The second 
area of contribution is to the literature on the Singapore state. (472 words) 
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Before Lee Hsien Loong became the first military officer to enter Singapore 
politics in 1984, Tan Chin Tiong also a military officer, had left the military to 
become a Permanent Secretary in a ministry in 1982. Tan Chin Tiong would be the 
first of many former senior military officers to cross over into the civilian 
bureaucracy, whereas Lee Hsien Loong would be the first of many senior military 
officers to enter politics. This thesis investigates the flow of military personnel into 
the state bureaucracy and into politics and the institutional bases for these flows.  
While the thesis touches on the governing elite in the bureaucratic and 
political spheres, this thesis is not about the governing or the power elite in the sense 
of C. Wright Mills’ The Power Elite. Rather, I examine their professional career 
trajectories, and account for the preponderance of personnel with military-security 
backgrounds in the Singapore state bureaucracy and in politics. 
 Singapore’s high standard of economic and social performance1 has been 
attributed to meritocracy.2 The state sponsors a scholarship system that seeks out 
young people with outstanding academic and co-curricular achievement. When these 
people enter the bureaucracy to serve out their contractual obligations, these people 
are then set on career paths in the public service toward leadership positions, or enter 
politics.  
                                                
1 Singapore’s governance performance can be seen in GDP growth and in the UN 
Human Development Index. Singapore’s GDP per capita in 1965 was US$516; in 
2014, it was US$56,284. Singapore’s HDI was 0.718 in 1990, and in 2015 it was 
0.912.  
2 Meritocracy is an official “pillar” in the Singapore government’s model of good 
governance. Neo and Chen (2007) elaborated upon meritocracy in Dynamic 




 Despite the recognition of Singapore’s economic performance, and the 
importance of economic performance as the source of legitimacy for the ruling 
political party (Chua, 1995), officials in the economic development portfolios do not 
form the majority of the top-level bureaucrats and in the political Cabinet. On the 
other hand, military personnel go on to enter politics or become the leaders of several 
state agencies. 
 Such observations suggest that a different account of the priorities of the 
Singapore state is needed, apart from the economic development narrative. I suggest 
that there are multiple central institutions in the Singapore state. Their existence, and 
ability to have reproduced over several decades will be examined in this thesis. 
Using frameworks from institutional logics – an offshoot of institutional 
theory, and using executive succession patterns framework for data analysis, I identify 
four central institutions, or institutional orders and their attendant institutional logics 
that exist and influence the Singapore state – military-security, economic, political, 
and professional. The military-security logic is concerned with territorial integrity, 
military deterrence, domestic security and political stability. The economic logic is 
concerned with economic development of the country, emphasising economic growth, 
that Singapore remains an attractive place for business, and jobs for Singaporeans, 
among other things. The professional logic is concerned with sound administration 
and governance, making sure that government expenses are balanced, that policies are 
well-implemented for the general betterment of the country and the people. The 
political logic has to do with the attainment of political power through democratic 
processes, the selection of people into the political sphere, and ultimately, decisions 




Subsequently in this section, I provide a brief comparison of institutional 
orders across states similar to Singapore in their emphasis on state action. South 
Korea and Taiwan are both significant as state-centric countries, and both have had 
regimes dominated by the military. This review shows that the influence of the 
military institution in the governing elite is not at all unusual in previous decades. 
What does stand out in Singapore is the systematic and persistent flow of military 
personnel to other areas of governance, including the economy and politics.  
 The domination of officers representing the military logic is contrasted with 
the emphasis on economic development in the Singapore state. If economic 
development were the main priority of the Singapore state, I would observe that some 
officers from the economic development organisations would occupy the top positions 
of the state bureaucracy and the Cabinet. However, this is not the case. What has 
instead happened is the dominance of former-military officers as chief executives in 
many of the important state bureaucracies and more notably, in Cabinet. With this, I 
argue that the Singapore state is dominated by the military-security logic, owing to the 
dominance of the vulnerability and survival-based ideology that began at 
independence, and has persisted till the present day. This persistence is due to the 
build-up of the leadership in the military, and the institutionalisation of their 
movement to elsewhere in the government, including into the Cabinet.  
 
1.1 The Singapore Situation 
 
 In this section, I develop the argument by showing that, despite the rapid 









Table 1. Number of former military personnel in Cabinet 	
Year Cabinet Size 
 
No. of members with military-
security ties (percentage) 
1959 9 0 
1965 10 0 
1970 10 0 
1975 12 0 
1981 16 0 
1985 15 1 (6.67) 
1990 16 2 (12.5) 
1995 14 3 (21.4) 
2001 17 6 (35.3) 
2006 20 6 (30.0) 
2011 15 6 (40.0) 





Table 2. Number of Permanent Secretaries with backgrounds affiliated with the Military-
















1980 0 0 1 1 2 (13.3) 15 
1984 1 0 1 2 4 (25.0) 16 
1990 1 0 0 3 4 (26.7) 15 
1995 1 0 2 3 6 (35.3) 17 
2000 0 0 2 5 7 (41.2) 17 
2005 4 2 2 5 13 (59.1) 22 
2010 8 2 2 3 15 (57.7) 26 
2016 6 2 2 1 11 (39.3) 28 






 The dominance of the military domain in the top leadership of the state 
bureaucracy and the Cabinet is not a given, given that multiple domains in the state 
developed rapidly in the period after independence.  I want to focus on the 
development of four domains: the military, the economic agencies promoting 
economic development, the overall state bureaucracy, and the political sphere. If 
leadership patterns follow the rapid development of the domains equally, there should 
be roughly equal proportion of leaders from the different domains, especially in the 
economic and from the bureaucratic domains. These expectations should be stronger 
given how senior bureaucrats in the state have routinely entered politics. Even so, 
what is striking is that former military leaders have gone on to join the Cabinet and 
the state bureaucracy more frequently than personnel from the economic and the rest 
of the state bureaucracy.  
 I will summarise briefly the developments in the Singapore state since 1965. 
There will be a more detailed investigation into the histories of the different domains 
identified – in the military, the economy, in the bureaucracy, and in the political 
sphere.  
 At independence in 1965, Singapore had a small-armed force consisting of 
two infantry brigades (Huxley 2000). It did not have an air force or a navy. 
Singapore's economy was also in a precarious position, with unemployment at 14% 
and with industries losing out from the loss of Malaysia as a potential hinterland 
(Rodan 1989). The bureaucracy was beginning to be responsive to the new situation, 
having been restructured and repurposed following the formation of the Political 
Study Centre, an organisation politicians created to provide public servants with the 




years immediately following independence saw Singapore taking large strides in the 
economic, defence, and in the other arenas.  
 By 1975, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) had developed an Air Force and 
the Navy (Huxley 2000: 19-21), and the Army itself was beginning to develop the 
other support arms (Huxley 2000:16-18). The economy was growing rapidly, from 
both the investments that were pouring into Singapore, and from some of the state-
owned enterprises (in Singapore’s parlance, the government-linked companies 
(GLCs)). Singapore had reached full employment. The Singapore state was also able 
to overcome the potential economic loss from the British military withdrawal in the 
1970s via the investment promotion effort and by the economic conversion of the 
British facilities (Rodan 1989). The rest of the bureaucracy was also able to address 
many of the issues of development, from the construction of public housing, to the 
construction of hospitals and schools, and was able undertake large-scale engineering 
projects such as the cleaning up of the Singapore and Kallang Rivers.  
 The rapid development of these and other fields could have translated into the 
induction of professionals into politics. The decades before the 1980s saw the Cabinet 
filled with either the first generation of politicians, or new Cabinet members from the 
public service, with some from the private sector. The 1980s and 1990s saw the 
introduction of senior military personnel into the Cabinet. The same trend occurred 
with the public service bureaucracy. From independence to the 1980s, the permanent 
secretaries and chief executives were filled with the legacy holders. Beginning from 
the 1980s, military personnel and those related to the development of military became 
permanent secretaries, and would come to form a substantial proportion of the 
permanent secretary-ship positions. This is the pattern that the thesis will account for 




policy domains that supply a large proportion of the leadership in both the state 
bureaucracy and in politics. Even though there have been analytical developments 
describing the role of the military in politics and administration, those works do not 
explain the or account for the absence of leaders from other policy domains that also 
saw rapid expansion in the years after independence. With the use of the institutional 
logics literature, there is at least an analytical path to the identification of the 
environment and how it interacts with the selection of leadership in the political 
Cabinet and the public bureaucracy.  
 
1.2 Comparison with South Korea and Taiwan 
 
 Singapore's pattern of having the military dominate the rest of the state 
bureaucracy and politics is not unique in Southeast or East Asia. In the decades after 
the Second World War, South Korea and Taiwan developed authoritarian systems that 
also saw the heavy influence of the military on the rest of the bureaucracy and in 
politics. What follows in the next section is a discussion on how the military in both 
countries influenced the politics and bureaucracies.  
1.2.1 Military influence in South Korea 
 
 The end of the Second World War saw the Korean peninsula divided between 
a Soviet Union-supported North Korea, and a US-supported South Korea. The first 
leader of South Korea was Syngman Rhee from 1948, who became an autocratic 
leader and was highly corrupt. His rule ended in 1960, toppled by a military coup, 
from which Park Chung Hee rose to power in 1961. Inspired by his time in the 
Japanese military, Park undertook a modernisation plan for South Korea, during 




developmental state, using state power to force entrepreneurs to undertake 
industrialisation. He was assassinated in 1979, and Chun Doo Hwan, another military 
leader succeeded, him from 1980 to 1987. His time saw a transition to democracy 
when Roh Tae Woo, another military figure, became president in 1988 (Cheng, 
Haggard and Kang1998). South Korea features a strong presidential system where the 
president appoints ministers. 
South Korea's economic developmental history is therefore tied to the military. 
During Park Chung Hee's reign from 1961 to 1979, Park created several bureaucratic 
organisations to manage the economy and established ties with the leaders of the 
chaebol. Park used corruption charges to coerce the chaebols to work with him in 
economic development (ibid). Park also enforced export discipline on the chaebols, 
with export figures reported directly to Park.   
Park was also concerned with his own political survival. Having gained power 
through a military coup, he was concerned about the possibility of senior military 
officers organising a coup against his own rule. To that end, he created a two-track 
career in the military - a professional track to ensure that the military was capable of 
responding to a North Korean attack, and a political track that helped to ensure regime 
survival (Kim and Joo-Hong, 2011). Park created multiple military institutions around 
regime survival, to play leaders of the different commands against each other. With 
this mutual monitoring, the separate military commands would have less capacity to 
mount a coup against Park (Kim and Joo-Hong, 2011, p. 171). 
Park Chung Hee was later assassinated in 1979, and another military officer, 
Chun Doo Hwan rose up to replace him. Chun maintained the two-track system in the 




movement that culminated in the elections in 1987. This paved the way to complete 
democratisation, and led to the military’s decline in influence.  
Ha and Kang (2010) studied one part of the South Korean state bureaucracy - 
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry from the 1940s to the 1970s. Ha and Kang 
found a substantial presence of military officers during the start of Park's 
administration in 1961. In the 1961-5 period, Ha and Kang find that 21.1% of senior 
bureaucrats were ex-military officers. Although in the total sample from 1940 to 
1970, the average proportion of ex-military officers was around 10%, Ha and Kang 
noted that they were recruited into the senior ranks. This pattern of recruitment 
happened in the late 1970s, when President Park allowed military academy graduates 
to serve in government. Ha and Kang notes: 
These former military officers tried to enhance the organisational discipline of 
civilian bureaucracy by incorporating “modern administrative practices” found 
within the military sector. This pattern implicates that the military government 
intended to secure bureaucratic loyalty to the leader, Park Chung Hee, using the 
ex-military officers.  
 
In the political arena, military officials occupied around 15-20% of the 
government ministers during the Park Chung Hee administration from 1961-1979, 
and then the Chun Doo Hwan administration from 1980 to 1987 (Kim, 2007). The 
Park administrations imposed a military logic, in combination with a political one, as 
he maintained power by playing different military and security factions against each 
other.   
 
Table 3. Proportion of Government Ministers with Military Background 1945 – 1992 
(Data from Kim, 2007: 26) 
 Park Chung Hee 1 
(1961-1971) 
Park Chung Hee II 
(1971-1979) 
Chun Doo Hwan  
(1980-1987) 
Military 33 (35.1) 16 (17.6) 21 (22.1) 






The political influence of the military officers continued during the Chun Doo 
Hwan administration. Kim also collated the occupational backgrounds of National 
Assembly members from 1980 to 2000. I focus on the proportion of military officers 




Table 4. Proportion of National Assembly Members with Military Background 1980-
2000 (Data from Kim, 2007: 29) 
 1980 1982 1988 1992 1996 2000 
Military 22 (12.5) 22 (8.0) 18 (6.0) 13 (4.3) 14 (4.7) 3 (1.1) 
Total 176 276 299 299 299 273 
 
 
The diminishing influence of the military in politics is followed the 
democratisation process in South Korea. While former military officials continue to 
have influence in the bureaucracy, the representation in the politics declined both in 
proportion and in absolute figures as democratisation occurred in South Korea. By the 
mid-1990s, democratisation was firmly in place, leading to the withdrawal of legacy 
former military officials in politics.  
1.2.2 The military and the KMT in Taiwan 
 
 After the defeat of the KMT in 1949 in Mainland China to the Communists, 
Chiang Kai Shek moved to Taiwan island with the initial aim of returning to the 
mainland. That later changed, and Chiang Kai Shek institutionalised his rule on the 
island using the KMT and his control over security forces. The KMT penetrated into 




the military, the KMT also adopted a political commissar system to watch for political 
subversion in the military units (Cheng, 1989).  
 This began to change throughout the 1970s through to the1980s, and in 1986 
martial law was lifted and opposition parties were allowed to form. The 1980s period 
was a time when the opposition parties and the KMT continued to negotiate on the 
terms of democratisation in Taiwan (ibid). 
 The military was well represented in parts of the KMT. The proportion of 
military officers in the KMT Central Committee was 31.3 per cent in 1952, although 
it declined to 10.0 per cent in 1987 (Kuehn, 2008). Despite this decline, the military 
was still a substantial influence in the party. The military representatives had no 
formally defined policy responsibility, and could extend their influence in non-
security related matters. For example, the military had consistently vetoed the 
legalisation of population measures, intending to maintain a supply of soldiers for the 
military. The National Security Council, composing of military staff, could also have 
veto power over the state budget (ibid). This effectively secured funding for the 
military.  
 The military was also influential in Taiwan’s governance. Organisations such 
as the Taiwan Garrison Command were responsible with maintaining domestic 
political order, including the responsibility of censorship and cracking down on 
dissidents without trial (Fravel 2002). Chiang Kai-Shek also instituted the National 
Security Council (NSC) above other legislative bodies in 1967. A Political 
Commissar System (PCS) and the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) 
were set up to ensure the loyalty of the armed forces to the KMT. The relationship 
between the KMT and the military were so close that their insignia were the same 




 Although the Taiwanese civil service was largely meritocratic during the 
entire period of authoritarian rule under Chiang Kai-Shek and Chiang Ching-Kuo, 
there were avenues for placing military or politically related personnel into the civil 
service (Tan 2000). Measures such as having special examinations in place of 
standard examinations allow for selected personnel to enter the bureaucracy, 
including former military officers, though at the lower and middle levels of the 
bureaucracy.  
 The influence of the military only abated after democratisation in the 1990s. 
Although there were reforms for greater civilian control over the military, the impact 
of these reforms were still limited, as demonstrated through the appointment of a 
former military general as the Minister of National Defence (Fravel 2002). In the 
authoritarian era, the military could influence the public via its own media channels. 
This too, ended with democratisation. The influence of the military has also declined, 
as the KMT no longer has military officers serving in the central committee. Even 
when the political parties have vastly different stances on the issue of China, the 
military has declared itself politically neutral (ibid). 
 For the case of Taiwan, the military logic can be seen to have declined in 
influence, from being pervasive throughout the society and state, to being limited to a 
specific set of issues, in some ways reminiscent of South Korea’s experience. 
Taiwan’s political logic has also dramatically changed, from being one of 
authoritarianism, to democratisation.  
 





 Since WWII, both countries have had to contend with difficult geopolitical 
environments. South Korea faces the constant threat of a military attack from North 
Korea. Taiwan faces a far larger China that could one day seize the island by force. 
Both countries have had the United States as an ally or partner. Both countries have 
had military conscription. In their pre-democratic eras, both countries have had the 
military playing a significant role in their politics and vice versa. Since the transition 
of both countries to democracy, the military has played a smaller role and their 
activities have been restricted to professional matters. While there might be legacy 
issues that could be politicised, the military has not played the outsized role it once 
did in interfering with civilian politics. In both countries, bureaucratic and political 
succession has become almost a purely civilian affair, as professional politicians 
embark on contests to obtain the popular mandate.  Many politicians come from the 
bureaucracy.   
 With this short survey of the histories of South Korea and Taiwan, I can now 
suggest the dominant logics that exist in these countries. In South Korea, the military 
logic became dominant as the ruling regime placed military security as the most 
important priority. The South Korean state was also deeply involved in economic 
development, exemplified by Park’s personal involvement in setting up economic 
plans. Post-democratisation, the military logic has waned, and the political logic of 
democracy has become important. With Taiwan the political and military-security 
logics dominated, as the KMT penetrated into social life, while the KMT itself had a 
significant presence of military officers. This has changed significantly after 
democratisation. Military officers no longer dominate the KMT, and the cadre system 
has been dismantled. With the military a politically neutral force, the military 




1.2.4 South Korea and Taiwan as developmental states 
 
 
South Korea and Taiwan exemplified the historical developmental state that 
supported rapid economic growth in both countries. The key developmental state 
period can be dated to the early 1960s with Park Chung Hee taking power, and in the 
1950s with the creation of the Committee of US Aid (CUSA) in the 1950s under 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek (Cheng et. al. 1998). The two leaders then used state 
bureaucracies to start export-oriented industrialisation. This is an instance of how the 
state bureaucracy can come to be influenced by the economic logic, albeit in a narrow 
sense, since the economic organisations responsible for implementing economic 
development were insulated from the rest of the bureaucracy and staff did not ascend 
to higher levels of political or bureaucratic authority. Here, I will look at the economic 
development experience of both countries using the literature of the developmental 
state as a guide.  
There are several comparisons studies of Taiwan and South Korea, sometimes 
together with other countries as part of the developmental state literature. Cheng et. al. 
compared the bureaucratic arrangements of Taiwan and South Korea. Although both 
countries were able to grow rapidly under an authoritarian leadership, their 
bureaucratic arrangements were still quite different. Although both countries had 
similar pilot agencies for bureaucratic states, Taiwan had a more fluid economic 
bureaucracy, relying on more informal interlocks between different economic 
organisations. Multiple economic organisations had responsibility for economic and 
industrial development: there were bodies such as the CUSA, the Council on 
Economic Cooperation and Development (CIECD), the Economic Planning 
Commission (EPC), and the Council on Economic Planning and Development 




bodies, such as the CEPD were allowed to direct personnel directly into their 
ministries, without going through the route of civil service examinations. South Korea 
on the other hand, took a more centralised route, as Park Chung Hee centralised 
economic planning under the Economic Planning Board (EPB), a super-ministry that 
took functions for the Ministry of Finance and ministry of Home Affairs (ibid). Park 
was able to insulate the economic ministry politically, by political posts for his allies 
in other parts of government. Nonetheless, Park felt that he had to circumvent the 
bureaucracy on occasions, such as when enacting a Heavy Industry drive in the 1970s, 
with an aim of developing a military-industrial complex and allowing South Korea the 
means for self-reliance in defence (Woo-Cumings 1998).  
 There have been other kinds of comparisons, looking at the differences in 
economic structures in Taiwan and South Korea. Hamilton and Biggart (1988) looked 
at how market and cultural explanations explains growth, while a political economy 
based explanation better account for organisational structure. The framework accounts 
for the vertically hierarchical Korean chaebol in contrast to the Taiwanese small 
enterprises. Biggart and Guillen (1999) looked into detail the state-corporation 
arrangements that caused differences in how South Korean and Taiwanese companies 
entered the automobile industries. Taiwan’s small enterprises made it more suited to 
compete in components, while the vertically integrated chaebols were able to 
participate in vehicle assembly. Despite these differences, the comparisons still show 
the involvement of the state deeply involved in economic development.  
 Another site of comparison is with how South Korea and Taiwan undertook 
economic liberalisation, though still engineered by the states. With both being 
developmental states, the path towards economic liberalisation were very different, 




Thurbon (2001) looked at how South Korea and Taiwan liberalised their financial 
systems. Although both countries liberalised their financial systems, South Korea's 
haphazard liberalisation without state scrutiny led to South Korea being hit harder 
during the Asian Financial Crisis. Taiwan's liberalisation on the other hand was a 
more cautious, and resulted in Taiwan emerging from the financial crisis nearly 
unscathed.   
 Despite these liberalisations in the financial sectors in South Korea and 
Taiwan, Weiss (2000) argues that they do not necessarily constitute a decline in the 
developmental states in these countries and in Japan. Weiss argues that these states 
have adapted to new circumstances. Taiwan’s bureaucracy still identifies industries 
for priorities, while the South Korean state still partners with chaebols for 
competitiveness. The state retains influence in the economy in both South Korea and 
Taiwan, though certainly different in extent compared to previous eras.   
1.2.5 Taiwan and South Korea compared 
 
With this review of South Korea and Taiwan, I draw the following points for 
further discussion. The first is that institutional logics can remain stable for several 
decades. The military-centric state in South Korea lasted from 1960s to the 1980s 
through a period of immense social and economic changes. The influence of the 
political and military logics in the KMT lasted from the 1950s through to the 1990s. 
In this regard, the situation of Singapore is hardly unusual. The second point is that 
the strength of institutional orders can change over time. With social and economic 
changes, the governing authorities in South Korea and Taiwan underwent  
democratisation processes that reduced the influenced of the military, and to de-
politicise the military. The stability in Singapore’s institutional logics can be 




into many parts of Singapore society reminiscent of the KMT. A fragmented and 
weak political opposition is unable to present a compelling set of ideas to govern 
Singapore that is also markedly different from those espoused by the PAP. What is of 
further interest is that, whereas South Korea and Taiwan have seen a decline in the 
influence of the military institution, the same has not happened in Singapore, and that 
the military has remained entrenched over the years.  
The dominance of the military in Singapore's administrative and political 
leadership has been looked at through the lens of civil-military fusion. While this will 
be mentioned in subsequent sections of the thesis, Tan Tai Yong (2001) had 
conceptualised the idea of a civil-military fusion describing how the military and the 
rest of the bureaucracy had been fused together, creating a common pool of leadership 
to be deployed by the state. While this is a useful way of describing the situation, the 
civil-military lens obscures the development of other institutions in the Singapore 
state, and begs the question of the dominance of the military over other policy 
domains.  
The next chapter will explore in greater detail the theoretical framework of 
institutional logics employed here, and the development of the institutional orders and 






2 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 In this chapter, I develop the analytical framework for the thesis. I look into 
the body of literature on elites in the sociological literature, as well as the studies on 
Singapore elites. I examine in turn, institutionalism theories, both new institutionalism 
and institutional logics. Subsequently, I examine with greater detail the historical 
development of the Singapore’s central institutions – the economy, the military, the 
bureaucracy and in politics. For each central institution I also construct the 
institutional logic.  
 
2.1 Elites  
 
 
This thesis is a study of a segment of elites in the Singapore. In particular, I 
look at the governing elites in the Singapore state, focusing on the top leadership 
positions of the ministries and the statutory boards. I also look at the composition of 
the political Cabinet, and describing the flows between from the military and state 
bureaucracy and into politics.  
 The study of elites has been a major thread in sociology. Khan (2012) has 
undertaken a review of the various threads of studies on the elite. Khan grouped the 
area into a few categories, noting the classical works that look at how is it that a small 
group of people can come to have disproportionate power and other resources, and 
rule over a much larger society. Khan looked at the various kinds of resources that 
elites have access to: political, economic, social, cultural and knowledge. The last 
section of his review looked at how elites construct institutions for their reproduction. 
Of relevance here are the political elites, and one of the mechanisms for their 




looking at how the elites in America share a common interest together due to their 
common backgrounds and socialisation. As Khan notes, Mills’ analysis of the elite in 
the United States has elements of the structural analysis of Mosca (1960), where a 
small group of people is able to coordinate better than a large group; elements of 
Michels (1962), where the task of organisation leads to an oligarchy; of Veblen 
(1899), who characterised the cultural elements of the elite; of Pareto (1984[1921]), 
where elites can be refreshed through the introduction of new members.  
 Khan looked at the contributions of Domhoff in the American context. 
Domhoff (1967, 1974, 1978, 1979) looks at the role of education, and socialisation 
that brings together young people into the business and political elite. Bourdieu’s 
work on the elite is instructive, but not directly instrumental for this thesis. Distinction 
(1984[1979]) looked at how the cultural preferences of the elite dictate the 
preferences for the rest of society. Bourdieu’s The State Nobility (1996) looked at how 
the state education system perpetuates inequality as elites transfer their social and 
cultural capital to their children using the state education system.  
 In this thesis, I am interested in the preference for military-security personnel 
in the highest ranks of the state bureaucracy and in the political Cabinet. Barr (2008) 
did look at how recruitment into the top ranks of the bureaucracy and the military are 
facilitated through a few secondary schools who cultivate students and help them 
attain prestigious scholarships, that help them enter into a successful career in the 
state organisations. Although the national scholarship system is an important way 
through which people rise up through the organisations, it is not at all a given that 
they will succeed in rising to the apex of their organisations, and will subsequently be 




 There are studies about the political and bureaucratic elites in Singapore, and 
their interactions with the economic domain. Although Barr (2008) and Hamilton-
Hart (2000) looked at the elites in Singapore, they have not looked at the specific 
career trajectories of important personnel in a comparative way. Gaps in the literature 
exist in looking at the system of rotations of military officers from one domain to the 
other – in this case, the movement of military officers to the civilian bureaucracy. 
Although Koh (1995) looked at the social characteristics of the senior bureaucratic 
leaders, the study focused on their attitudes towards political change and how they 
viewed their work, with less emphasis on the institutional influences of their work.  
 The authors have also commented on the stability of the system created. Barr 
(2008) establishes Singapore’s “elite governance” - looking at Lee Kuan Yew’s 
efforts to find talented individuals (using education and the state scholarship system) 
for the service of governing (Lee, Kuan Yew 2000; Lee 2011). However, Barr and 
other studies of Singapore’s elites fail to account for the military-centric selection for 
the highest government positions. This study aims to fill this niche in providing both 
an analytical account of the presence of military officers in both the state bureaucracy 




Institutional theories have had a long tradition in sociology. An institution, 
according to Jepperson, refers to “a social order or pattern that has attained a certain 
state or property; institutionalisation denotes the process of such attainment. By order 
or pattern, I refer as is conventional, to standardised interaction sequences. ... Put in 
another way: institutions are those social patterns that, when chronically reproduced, 




literature on institutionalisation is relevant to understand the persistence of military 
officers’ domination in civilian bureaucracy and politics.   
 The new institutionalism stands in contrast to a previous iteration of the 
institutional theory that was focused on the interests between organisations and 
interest groups. Philip Selznick, as an exemplar of this previous institutionalism, 
looked at the Tennessee Valley Authority and the engagement of community groups 
to protect an electrification programme in the region, as a study of power, interests 
and organisations (Selznick 1949). 
In new institutionalism, issues of interests and conflicts are downplayed. 
Instead, the new institutionalists look at how organisational structures reflect myths 
rather than rationality. Organisations adopt particular kinds of organisational 
structures not because they are effective, but because particular structures have 
become the norm for similar organisations. DiMaggio and Powell pointed out this 
isomorphism (1983), and Meyer and Rowan (1977) pointed out the “rational myths” 
in organisations.3 For new institutionalists, studying institutionalisation means 
studying an entire industry or group of organisations, rather than focusing on just one.  
The value of new institutionalism in this thesis is that it provides a plausible 
account for the process of leadership changes (in this thesis, executive succession). It 
could be the case that military-personnel come to dominate leadership in public sector 
organisations due to normative, coercive, or mimetic isomorphism. Perhaps the 
military organisations are highly regarded, and so senior military personnel come to 
acquire legitimacy they would otherwise not have. Once this initial pattern is 
established, normative or mimetic forms of isomorphism could account for the rest of 
the adoption pattern. 
                                                
3 For Meyer and Rowan, rational myths refer to the formal structures – of rules, 




While this could be the case, there remain various gaps in that explanation. 
One is that we would still have to account for the initial movement of military 
personnel to other spheres in the first place. The second is the accounting for the 
movement of military personnel to a wide variety of organisations, some of which 
would have their own ethos and would resist the entry of senior military personnel for 
their leadership. In addition, the rest of the bureaucracies have not become more like 
the military – the civilian bureaucracies have not become more regimented or more 
hierarchical in their relations. In addition, the imposition of military-style leadership 
could also invite resistance from the rest of the civilian employees, some of who have 
their own ethos. 
 
2.3 Institutional Logics 
 
Friedland and Alford (1991) argued that institutionalism should be used to 
look at society as a whole instead of continuing on a “theoretical retreat from 
society”. Friedland and Alford thus proposed a framework to apply institutional 
theory to society. They described the central institutions in the “West” – “capitalist 
markets, bureaucratic state, democracy, nuclear family, and Christian religion – and 
how they shape individual preferences and organisational interests as well as the 
repertoire of behaviours by which they may attain them” (p. 232). 
 Friedland and Alford then further describe these central institutions as 
“institutional orders” in an inter-institutional system. These orders have “a central 
logic – a set of material practices and symbolic constructions – which constitutes its 
organising principles and which is available to organisations and individuals to 




the terminology of Thornton and subsequent scholars on the topic (Thornton, 2004; 
Thornton et al., 2012).   
The literature on institutional logics has become quite significant. An 
exhaustive overview of the institutional logics literature is not necessary, as there is 
significant consensus in the literature on what institutional logics are. I will provide a 
brief overview of the main tenets of the institutional logics framework, before going 
into greater detail some of the reference concepts on which this thesis borrows heavily 
from.  
As Gemici (2016) has pointed out, the institutional logics literature has 
emphasised using institutional contradictions to look at the relationships between 
different logics. The focus on different logics over time, and the response in 
organisations and organisational fields to different logics has spawned a voluminous 
literature. There have been multiple studies in healthcare, ranging from changes in the 
balance between care and science logics (Dunn and Jones, 2010); in configurations of 
healthcare systems (Reay and Hinings 2009) and how individuals respond to these 
changes in logics (Reay and Goodrick 2013); elsewhere in the medical system where 
law, family and science logics compete (Heimer 1999); at how identity and 
institutional logics can come into conflict (Pouthier et. al., 2013). There has been at 
least one instance of international comparison again in the healthcare industry 
(Waldorff, Reay and Goodrick 2013). Another category of studies looks at how 
institutional logics in industries change. Lounsbury (2005) looked at the exogenous 
factors of change in recycling advocacy groups. Marquis and Lounsbury (2007) 
looked at long-term change in community banking. Greenwood et. al. (2011) provided 
an overview of the institutional logics literature, looking at how organisations adapt to 




What I will do here is to focus on the aspects of the literature that discuss the 
interactions between multiple logics and how they act on organisations, and 
conversely, how organisations cope with the tensions of having multiple logics.  
Battalina and Dorado (2010) wrote about how some organisations have to 
handle the tension of having competing institutional logics by looking at the 
microfinance organisations in Bolivia. These organisations straddle two institutional 
logics – banking and developmental logics. These microfinance organisations were 
able to priorities between these logics through the hiring process. Whereas one 
organisation hired from a variety of career backgrounds representing the banking and 
development logics, the other organisation preferred to hire straight from the 
university in an attempt to socialise employees into the work. The organisation tried 
to balance the two logics through the hiring process ended up going through a difficult 
process of adjustment that saw the near-dominance of one of the logics. The other 
organisation that emphasised more on socialising employees into the organisation 
through training was able to side step the issue of having competing logics potentially 
disrupting the organisation. Battalina and Dorado’s work points towards how 
organisations can undertake different strategies to maintain cohesion despite the 
presence of multiple logics. These two models were described as “integration” in the 
former case of bringing together people from different career backgrounds, and 
“apprenticeship” to illustrate the latter situation to socialise people directly into the 
work. The Singapore state bureaucracy has had to perform integration at the highest 
levels of leadership, given how people of different career backgrounds representing 
the influence of different institutional logics have to come together.  
Thornton and Ocasio’s (1999) work is relevant here, in looking at how 




executives in the area of the higher-education publishing industry. Thornton and 
Ocasio documented how changes in the higher-education publishing industry changed 
the kinds of executives that were sought after. The change documented was between 
the “editorial logic” governed by editor-author relationships, to the “market logic”, 
governed by the need to grow the company.  
Thornton et. al. (2005) have gone on to look at similar changes in institutional 
logics across other professions: accounting and architecture. Similar to the higher-
education publishing industries, Thornton et. al. identified how the institutional logics 
in these professions have changed, leading to changes in organisational structure and 
leadership succession.  
Fligstein’s (1985) work on the intraorganisational sources of power and the 
change in the career backgrounds of executives is also highly relevant to the thesis 
here, in looking at how the career backgrounds of chief executives at major American 
corporations have changed in the 20th century. The chief executive position represents 
the result of political struggle within the organisation between the different units. The 
career background of the chief executive thus represents the power balance between 
the different sub-units within the company.  
Fligstein’s work is certainly not the only one using succession patterns. The 
entire area of executive succession in particular and career mobility in general has 
been a rich source of sociological research, and only a fraction of them are used in the 
context of institutional approaches. Ralph Turner (1960) has looked at patterns of 
career mobility, looking at sponsored and contest models of mobility. In sponsored 
mobility, people rise through the ranks because of patronage, while in contest model, 
there is competition between different candidates for an open position. Then there is 




career mobility across the organisational hierarchy. Executive succession has also 
been used to identify the institutions that take hold in a large polity. Shih et al (2012) 
study how officials are promoted in China over a period of several decades, and 
suggest that meritocracy is secondary to patronage and higher education attainment in 
the Chinese Communist Party. These works are only a small fraction of the entire 
field that looks at career mobility in general. For this thesis, I return to Fligstein’s and 
Thornton’s use of executive succession to look at the broader institutions and 
institutional logics that affect the Singapore state.  
W. Richard Scott (2014) conceptualised the pillars of institutions, and their 
carriers. For Scott, there were several types of carriers responsible for the 
transmission of institutional practices. There were several kinds of carriers: symbolic, 
relational, activities, and artifacts. Of interest here is the notion of relational carriers - 
that the movement of people between different organisations and departments also 
constitutes movements of institutions. For the situation here, the movement of people 
across organisations also reflects larger institutions that influence the movements in 
the first place.  
In this regard, Fligstein's (1987) study is instructive. Fligstein's study of CEO 
backgrounds across several decades illustrates how external environments affects the 
corporate strategies of companies, and that in turn affects the kinds of CEO that heads 
up companies.  
The situation is somewhat similar, although there are also significant 
differences. As with Fligstein, individuals represent carriers of institutional practices 
and worldviews, developed through their carrier backgrounds. For those with a long 
career in the military, they would have developed particular worldviews and practices, 




for those who come from careers with strong professional ethos, such as doctors who 
practice medicine, teachers, lawyers, and career engineers who supervise large-scale 
technical projects. The Administrative Service in the public service might not be as 
professionalised as doctors or lawyers, but their career experience also allows for a 
development of an esprit de corps amongst them.  
What is also different about this study is the shorter duration (three decades, as 
opposed to Fligstein's eight), and the lack of institutional change observed. In the 
duration of the study, the same political party has remained in power, with the same 
ideology being in placed throughout the three decades in this study. What is observed 
therefore, is a consistent pattern of military leaders entering into unrelated civilian 
areas. One finds military leaders entering into policy domains as diverse as education, 
economy, and even some agencies in the social sector.  
Fligstein's work, together with the notion of personnel as relational carriers of 
institutions, provides the analytic framework for the study. By examining the career 
backgrounds of the leaders in the Singapore state bureaucracy and in the political 
Cabinet, I am able to identify the existence of various institutional logics in the 
Singapore state. Coupled together with the contextual history and the circumstances 
surrounding Singapore's independence, I am able to describe how the dominant logic 
came about, and its perpetuation through the following decades.  
These works are relevant in how they point out that the composition of leaders 
in the Singapore Public Service and in the Cabinet represents the underlying 
preference for the military organisations, and also for the dominance of the military-
security logic in the Singapore state.  
However, there are still shortcomings in the area of institutional logics and 




institutional orders, and the reframing of some of the existing ones. For the case of 
Singapore, an additional institutional order is required: the military-security logic. 
This logic exists in societies that have experienced some form of existential threat to 
their physical existence. This logic is likely to exist in countries that have had 
historical experiences of invasion or occupation. It has existed in South Korea and 
Taiwan, as pointed out previously. Outside of these examples, Israel is also likely to 
have the military logic albeit in a different form.  
The second shortcoming of the existing formulation of institutional order is 
the need to reframe the political order. In the Friedland and Alford schema, the form 
of political system was democracy as the default, reflecting the West-centric view of 
governance. Democracy is certainly not the basis of governance in several countries; 
therefore broader term in line with political sociology – “political logic”, reflecting 
how different factions in societies compete for power, is much more useful. A 
political logic that looks fundamentally at the distribution of power and the forms of 
rulemaking are more useful and makes the institutional logic framework more suitable 







3 INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS IN THE SINGAPORE STATE 
 
 
 In this section, I will elaborate on the histories of the central institutions in the 
Singapore state. The historically rapid development of the military and the attendant 
logic associated with it give rise to the dominance of the military-security logic that 
dominates in the leadership of the Singapore state bureaucracy and in the political 
Cabinet.  
3.1 Development of the Military and the Military-Security Logic 
 
 The geopolitical assumptions of Singapore's foreign and military policies need 
to be stated here. Michael Leifer (2000) wrote about how Singapore's leaders never 
took Singapore's independence for granted. Singapore's independence in 1965 was 
also far from a foregone conclusion; Malaysian leaders at that time had ideas about 
'retaking' Singapore; Indonesia was also embarking on the Konfrontasi campaign that 
saw attacks in Singapore and Malaysia. Post-independence, Malaysian leaders have at 
various times, threatened to cut off Singapore's water supplies. In 1991, a military 
exercise in the Malaysian state of Johor bordering Singapore was seen to present a 
sufficient military threat to justify the mobilisation of large numbers of reservists in 
Singapore. The notion of Singapore's physical vulnerability, neighbouring far larger 
countries is thus never far from the minds of the political leadership in Singapore. 
Singapore's foreign and military policies are thus designed to work around, and to 
mitigate these vulnerabilities. As I will point out, the efforts to develop the military 
have led to various consequences, such as the development of a military-industrial 
complex, and the creation of a pool of leaders to be deployed in both the political 





 The basis of the rapid development of the military in Singapore's history can 
be traced back to several events in Singapore's history. The fall of Singapore to 
Japanese forces in 1942 was one factor that contributed to the thinking that Singapore 
needed its own armed force. The second factor was the presence of Malaysian armed 
forces during the sensitive period of separation. Both of these episodes highlighted 
Singapore’s weak defences against armed threats. Conceptually, the early political 
leaders at independence felt Singapore's intrinsic vulnerability. Michael Leifer (2000) 
wrote about how vulnerability expresses itself through the conduct of Singapore's 
foreign policy. However, vulnerability is not just the frame for foreign policy, it is a 
set of assumptions widely held by the Singapore political leadership that expresses 
itself in many areas of society. Nonetheless, the military and the security-related 
forces are still the lead organisations in driving vulnerability and the military-security 
logic. They are, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), comprising the Army, Navy and 
Air Force; the intelligence agencies - the Security and Intelligence Division and the 
Internal Security Department, and the Singapore Police Force. The mission of these 
organisations is to defend Singapore from both internal and external threats. The 
mission of the SAF is to, “enhance Singapore's peace and security through deterrence 
and diplomacy, and should these fail, to secure a swift and decisive victory over the 
aggressor.” (MINDEF 2016) The mission of the Singapore Police Force is, “to protect 
the people who live in Singapore from crime and all manner of criminal 
harm.”(Singapore Police Force 2016)  
 A historical overview of the military build-up provides a narrative account for 
how the military-security logic came to dominance over the other competing logics in 
the Singapore state bureaucracy and in politics. The rapid military build-up 




process, there were ample opportunities for technical and managerial development - 
skills that could be transferable to the economy. In parallel to the military build-up, 
the military industry was also created. The companies in the military industry 
subsequently expanded to take on commercial opportunities and were involved in 
policy initiatives as well. The account that follows will take on each of these themes 
in turn.  
Throughout the twentieth century, the British had a substantial military 
presence in Singapore. This continued in the post-World War 2 era. However, with a 
change in the economic conditions in the UK, the British had to withdraw their 
military presence in Singapore. This upset the expectations of Singapore’s political 
leaders, who had thought that the British would only withdraw in the mid-1970s, 
Kuan Yew 2000). However, a change in the political conditions in the UK hastened 
the withdrawal of the British military forces in Southeast Asia. This meant that 
Singapore had to create a military force from scratch if its sovereignty were to remain 
meaningful (Lee, Kuan Yew 2000). This was at a time when Sukarno’s Indonesia 
waged a short campaign to disrupt the formation of Malaysia, with tactics such as the 
bombing of buildings in Singapore by armed commandos. Facing uncertain relations 
both northwards and southwards, militarisation was necessary to combat these threats. 
After both Egypt and India failed to respond to Singapore’s requests for aid, 
Israeli assistance was sought in the form of instructors who came to Singapore and 
trained the first batch of local officers and trainers (ibid). Conscription for military 
service was established under the National Service Act, and politicians had to 
convince the majority-Chinese population to comply with calls for military service 
(ibid). The SAF Overseas Scholarship (SAFOS) scheme was also established in 1970, 




The SAFOS scheme was important in developing the top tier of leaders from the 
military.  
 All three services – the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, underwent rapid 
development. The army’s development continued to the 1970s, with further 
expansions of the infantry units and the rapid establishment of other branches. 
Signals, commando, armour, and engineer units were raised. The Navy was also 
enlarged in the 1960s, and it was soon involved in preventing Vietnamese refugees 
from entering the island (Huxley 2000). By the late 1970s, the Navy had expanded 
rapidly, and by the 1980s, had missile corvettes. The Air Force was “built from 
scratch” (Lee, Kuan Yew 2000: 20), with a plan based on the idea of buying second-
hand Royal Air Force planes. The Air Force expanded quickly, with the acquisition of 
jet trainers, ground attack aircraft, surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft guns. In the 
1980s, the Air Force acquired F-5s and Super Puma helicopters. In the late 1980s, the 
E-2 airborne early warning and control aircraft further boosted air defence 
capabilities.  
 All three branches have seen continual improvement since the period of rapid 
development. The Army in 2016 operates German Leopard 2A4 main battle tanks 
(MINDEF 2008); the Air Force operates a variant of the F-15 (MINDEF 2005), and 
the Navy operates stealth frigates and will acquire German submarines.  
 At the same time, a defence industry was also established, with the intent of 
supporting the SAF for particular needs. The defence industry companies were also 
strongly encouraged by MINDEF not to rely solely on SAF orders (Singapore 
Technologies 1997), and to find other markets to sell their products. The defence 
companies diversified, and a diversified conglomerate entity was created, initially 




Singapore Technologies was for a while, a Schedule 5 entity – involved in the 
management of Singapore government reserves (Ministry of Law 2014; Shanmugan, 
K. 2014). After a consolidation in 1997, the non-defence companies were transferred 
to Temasek Holdings while the defence companies were consolidated to form ST 
Engineering, also under Temasek Holdings. In this indirect way, the military industry 
contributed to Singapore's economic development, and became also an instrument of 
policy.4  
 In the 1990s government-linked companies formed consortia with other 
MNCs to build business parks in the rest of Asia (Yeo 2007), most notably in 
Indonesia and China (Singapore Technologies 1997). Through these partnerships, the 
Singapore state achieved its aim of developing a “second wing” (externally-directed) 
of the economy. One such example was a Singapore Technologies subsidiary, which 
established business parks with other partner MNCs to set up production facilities in 
Batam and Bintan islands in Indonesia, and in China. Philip Yeo, chairperson of the 
Economic Development Board at that time and former Permanent Secretary of 
Defence, was one of the proponents of this policy, and personally led fact-finding 
trips. The forms of these regional developments have since changed. As of 2016, 
Singapore has partnered with China’s cities5 and Indian states6 in their development.  
 From the 1970s to the 1990s, the leaders of the defense industries were also 
                                                
4 For accounts of the Singapore Defence Industries, refer to Singh (1990), Singh 
(2003), Huxley(2000: 172-195), and (Low 2001). 
5 See: China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park: http://www.sipac.gov.cn/english/; 
Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-City: http://www.tianjinecocity.gov.sg/bg_intro.htm; 
Sino-Singapore Guangzhou Knowledge City: http://www.ssgkc.com/P02_01.asp 
6 See press release: MTI. 2016. Singapore Delivers Final Master Plan for Andhra 








active bureaucrats serving in the Singapore Public Service7 , as was the case with 
other state companies. In this way, there were indirect but still substantial links 
between the defense industry companies and the larger economy, which have 
remained. Military industry companies entered commercial business to ensure a 
viable business model, allowing for cross-subsidies between different business units. 
The state had imposed a level of discipline on these companies that prevented them 
from expecting state bailouts should they fail (Lee , Kuan Yew 2000). That the 
defense industry took the form of a conglomerate business was the result of this logic. 
These companies were substantial manufacturing and industrial entities in their own 
right. For a time in the 1990s, Chartered Semiconductors was a close competitor to 
other semiconductor foundries (Singapore Technologies 1997).  
 That there were both direct and indirect links between the security/military 
domains and the economic domains is a link rarely emphasised in the literature of 
Singapore Studies. Yet, as shown here, there are links of both natures to this day. 
Owing to the scarcity of private sector entrepreneurs, bureaucrats who had proven 
ability were tasked with multiple roles. However, bureaucrats from each group did not 
demonstrate equal levels of role diversification; there seemed to be a hierarchical 
relationship between different policy domains. One notices that security/military 
bureaucrats oversaw and contributed to economic development, but that economic 
bureaucrats were rarely associated with military-security development. Philip Yeo - 
having established himself at the defence bureaucracy, could rotate between the two 
domains seamlessly. When Lim Siong Guan retired from the public bureaucracy in 
2006, he was appointed Chairman of the Economic Development Board. With these 
                                                
7 In Towards Tomorrow, several bureaucrats were mentioned: Cheong Quee Wah, 
and Philip Yeo. See also Chan Heng Chee's (1975), where she noted the directorships 




two figures, there is a directionality in appointments – that people from the military 
go on to enter the economic domain. The reverse direction – from economic domain 
to defence – happened less frequently. J Y Pillay is the most prominent bureaucrat to 
have had experience in the economic domain – running SIA and being PS of Finance 
and also in the military domain as the chairperson of Singapore Technologies. Ngiam 
Tong Dow, a senior bureaucrat, one-time chairperson at the EDB was also a one-time 
chairperson of the defence industries. Pillay and Ngiam are the exceptions, however.  
 These limited examples already begin to show that there is a hierarchy of 
backgrounds even amongst the top permanent secretaries. These differences in the 
career trajectories in the early developmental history of Singapore have continued. 
Even though economic development and viability was the major concern in the early 
years, the necessity for physical defence can be argued to be of greater priority than 
economic concerns. Within the state bureaucracy, this can be observed by noticing 
that the more military-security staff have gone on to become permanent secretaries, 
the topmost position in the ministry. Not only that, they have entered important 
economic agencies serving as the CEOs. They have also entered the political Cabinet 
more often than the economic staff.  
 The historical account has shown how the military-security logic came about. 
The need to build up the military rapidly together with the creation of the military 
industry companies concentrated people and resources. Military personnel who 
entered the military during this critical stage, include the initial batch of SAFOS 
recipients, would on their return enter into a military that was rapidly moving up the 
technology ladder as well. In this phase, these military personnel would have been 
working with technology that was not yet widespread across the rest of society. This 




command, would have given these people advantages in management, particularly 
technologically-related projects that could be relevant to the wider economy.  
 Soldiers in the SAFOS scheme also enjoyed resources and contacts with 
political holders. During the early years of the SAFOS scheme, this deliberate 
grooming, known as “Project Wrangler” in the 1970s (Barr 2008: 233-234; Lee, 
Hsien Loong 2000) gave scholarship holders a fast track into the senior levels of 
command and authority.  
 The scholarship system was part of a wider system of personnel management. 
Other components of this this include, a relatively young retirement age of officers (at 
45), and rotations every 2-3 years at command or staff positions. The officer corps is 
kept young so that the scholarship holders and other promising officers can be 
promoted rapidly and assume command. These measures undoubtedly other effects. 
The rapid movement of officers from one posting to another prevents any single 
officer to create a base of power. However, the effect of all these measures remain to 
make the SAF an attractive career for young people.  
 The sources of legitimacy for the military-security logic come from the 
maintenance of peace and security in Singapore. The military and intelligence 
agencies deter threats and to respond to them rapidly should they arise. The domestic 
security agencies maintain law and order and guard against subversion and the threat 
of terrorism.  
 The sources of authority come from the hierarchical nature of how these 
organisations are organised. Commands come from a central authority and flows 
downward to the ranks. Orders are not questioned and are executed.  
 To summarise, the rapid build-up of both the military forces and the military 




in both personnel and technical management. This rapid build-up was premised on the 
notion of Singapore's physical vulnerability to physical threats that was keenly felt by 
Singapore’s early leaders, and maintained over the successive decades and political 
leadership.  
 A further analysis on the SAF is appropriate here, given the existence of the 
civil-military literature. While this is not the place for an in-depth discussion of the 
literature as it relates to Singapore, there are some relevant arguments to attend to, in 
particular Tan Tai Yong's (2001) notion of the "civil-military fusion". For Tan, civil-
military fusion is the obliteration of the boundaries between the civilian bureaucracy 
and the Singapore Armed Forces, through several personnel measures. These 
measures include, an early retirement age for senior officers, and the establishment of 
a dual-career scheme, where military officers are rotated to civilian roles both during 
and after their military careers. Tan proposes that this fusion led to the creation of a 
pool of administrative and political personnel, some of whom then go on to enter 
politics, as has happened in several occasions.  
 The civil-military fusion has its merits. It goes some way in describing how 
the effect of this fusion leads to the creation of a talent pool for governance - both in 
the bureaucracy and in politics. However, Tan's focus on the civil-military interaction 
means that the focus on other policy domain is absent; in addition, it begs the question 
of why the military, over all other policy domains and institution, was selected as the 








3.2 Economic Development and the Economic Logic 
 
 
 The other logic that has influenced the Singapore state is the economic logic. 
The mission of the economic logic in the Singapore is to ensure Singapore's economic 
survival, especially after independence in 1965 in a separation from Malaysia. Prior to 
1965, economic survival was premised on a political union with Malaysia in the hopes 
of creating a single market, where Singapore goods could be sold in the larger 
Malaysian market. This economic strategy was pursued at a period of high 
unemployment, compounded by hostile neighbours (Lee, Kuan Yew 2000). In the 
political climate in Singapore at that time, the economic strategy was meant to deliver 
jobs to Singaporeans, and to simultaneously reduce support for Communists. When 
merger with Malaysia in 1963 failed due to political reasons, Singapore’s political 
leaders had to create alternative economic strategies to reduce unemployment. From 
having Malaysia as the hinterland, political leaders had to adjust to new realities. One 
such effort at readjustment was the “world city” concept (Rajaratnam 1972) that saw 
Singapore being connected to the world, with the world as the hinterland. 
 The subsequent steps the Singapore state took to organise economic 
development after 1965 have been described in the developmental state literature. 
Similar to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, Singapore established pilot agencies to 
coordinate industrial development (Johnson 1982; Stubbs 2009). Two broad strategies 
were pursued: export-oriented industrialisation, and the use of the state to create 
commercial companies wherever profitable opportunities arose. Export-oriented 
industrialisation was pursued, following United Nations advisors that Singapore had 
sought assistance from. The pilot agency/lead organisation representing the economic 




instilled discipline in companies, although with Singapore, the discipline was directed 
towards the state-created companies, not with the chaebols as with South Korea. The 
state would end up creating companies, such as the Development Bank of Singapore 
(DBS) and Singapore Airlines (SIA) and the former Port of Singapore Authority 
(PSA) (Chua 2015). Although the state started these enterprises, they were to operate 
fully as commercial entities and should not expect the state to subsidise their losses 
(Lee, Kuan Yew 2000).  
 The economic strategies pursued were successful, as full employment was 
achieved by the 1970s (Rodan 1989). The Singapore government began to become 
more selective of investment (ibid). Demand for labour attracted workers beyond 
neighbouring Malaysia, to include workers from around the region (ibid). By the 
1980s, capital-intensive industries began to operate in Singapore (ibid). New 
petrochemical and electronic facilities started operations in Singapore. By the 1990s 
mature Singapore companies began investing overseas. In the 2000s, Singapore 
launched the biomedical initiative – an effort to make Singapore into an attractive 
location for biomedical research, at around the same time that the human genome was 
mapped (Yeo 2007).  
 Singapore’s economy continues to serve as a production and business platform 
for foreign companies. At the same time, local businesses are supported through 
incentives and various forms of government assistance. The state continues to 
influence the economy through both regulation and incentives. Furthermore, the state 
continues to have stakes in the major government-linked companies through Temasek 
Holdings (Chua 2015).  
 The historical account provides the basis for the characterisation of the 




state’s economic agencies to ensure Singapore’s attractiveness to provide jobs for 
Singaporeans to maintain a high quality of life. This mission has remained 
fundamentally the same throughout the decades, even if the specific strategies might 
have changed. In the years after independence, the concern was in attracting industries 
to soak up the unemployment; in the decades after, the attention shifted to more 
capital- or knowledge-intensive jobs to match the increased education standards of the 
Singapore population.  
In the economic organisations, the sources of authority come from job creation 
and the expansion of economic space. Job creation refers to the attraction of foreign 
investors setting up operations in Singapore. The expansion of economic space refers 
to various types of projects, ranging from the negotiation of trade treaties with other 
countries, or in the creation of events that bring in revenue. These events can include 
having a leg of the Formula One Grand Prix taking place in Singapore or the creation 
of tourist sites such as the Marina Bay Sands and Resorts World Sentosa Integrated 
Resorts (with casinos) and the Gardens by the Bay.  
The history of rapid economic development might provide officers in the 
economic domain an advantage in terms of upward mobility in the Singapore Public 
Service. Perhaps an intimate understanding of Singapore’s strategy and having it 
translated in the economic sphere affords personnel in the economic logic an 
advantage that makes them suitable for positions in other domains. This is evidenced 
with four EDB officers entering the Cabinet in Singapore’s history. They were S 
Dhanablan, Yeo Cheow Tong, David Lim, and Lee Yock Suan. As of 2016, Lim 





 The developmental state however, does not go far enough in accounting for 
personnel flows to the highest ranks of the bureaucracy and the political Cabinet. As 
important as the economic logic was in the early years of Singapore’s development, it 
has not supplied leaders to the rest of the state bureaucracy or to the political sphere to 
the extent that the military logic has.  
 
3.3 Development of the Bureaucracy and the Professional Logic  
 
 
 The professional logic as expressed in the Singapore state operates in the state 
bureaucracy. Personnel serving in the bureaucracy come to imbibe a set of values that 
are sometimes inseparable from those of the dominant PAP. The mission of the 
Singapore state bureaucracy is to ensure efficient, technocratic, and predictable 
administration. One corollary of this is that the bureaucracy itself cannot be partisan, 
but must serve the political interests of the party in power. 
 The current Singapore state bureaucracy can trace its origins to 1959 when 
Singapore achieved full internal self-governance. The Singapore state at that time had 
full control of all domestic issues, from the economy to education. Foreign affairs and 
security were still left to the British, an arrangement that was to continue when 
Singapore joined the Malaysian Federation (Huxley 2000). When Singapore gained 
independence, there was an urgent need to develop both a foreign service and a 
military.  
 The Singapore Public Service still retains some historical links with the British 
service that it inherited. Some of these links can be found in the nomenclature of the 




More significantly, Singapore has also adopted the practice of grouping the top civil 
servants together under the "Administrative Service" - the same British term for a 
similar group. Military staff and police staff under the "dual-career" scheme can also 
enter the Administrative Service and the state bureaucracy. (Huxley 2000) To provide 
a sense of the exclusive nature of the Administrative Service, there are about 300 
Administrative Officers in the Administrative Service, out of about 60,000 
bureaucrats employed throughout the public service.8  The Singapore Public Service 
also hews closely to the classical Westminster system of political accountability and 
bureaucratic implementation. Public servants are supposed to be anonymous and 
follow political orders; they cannot defend themselves in public, relying on politicians 
to defend themselves.  
 The PAP influenced the bureaucracy after 1959 when Singapore attained full 
internal self-governance, and particularly, by Lee Kuan Yew. Lee Kuan Yew was not 
satisfied with the bureaucracy he inherited, and the bureaucrats at that time were also 
suspicious of the PAP (which still retained its Communist-learning Left). This 
changed subsequently, as Lee Kuan Yew launched the Political Study Centre to 
educate senior bureaucrats on the challenges that the country was facing. Speaking at 
the opening of the Political Study Centre, Lee (1959) had said,  
 Whether an administration functions efficiently and smoothly in the interests 
of the people or in the interests of a small section of the people, depends upon 
the policies of the ministers. But it is your responsibility to make sure that 
there is an efficient civil service. 
 
 
                                                




The total number of public servants is about 143,000. The 60,000 figure excludes 




 The early state bureaucracy then was a much smaller one than the one in the 
present day,9 in terms of the number of ministries and statutory boards. The number of 
ministries and statutory boards were smaller. The Ministry of Finance was arguably 
the most powerful agency, in charge of revenue, development and public sector 
manpower. This arrangement was not to last. In the subsequent decades, more 
ministries and agencies were created for various policy functions and implementing 
agencies were moved to different ministries. The current bureaucracy has 16 
ministries and over 60 agencies. 
 The bureaucracy had to perform multiple functions. On top of serving the 
traditional function of planning and enacting policies, the bureaucracy was also tasked 
with creating and managing commercial companies. Examples of this include 
Singapore Airlines (SIA) that was headed by J Y Pillay (National Library Board 
2016(d)), and the Development Bank of Singapore (DBS) under Ngiam Tong Dow 
(National Library Board(q)). 
 Beginning from the 1980s onwards, the bureaucracy at the senior levels 
increasingly comprised formerly uniformed personnel, or those affiliated with the 
military. This pattern has persisted over the decades, even as the entire bureaucracy 
has become larger, and would presumably have had staff with experience in the 
matters themselves.  
 The bureaucracy has contributed to the political sphere. Hon Sui Sen (National 
Library Board(a)) was a permanent secretary before being made Minister of Finance; 
Howe Yoon Chong (National Library Board(b)) was the head of civil service before 
entering the Cabinet. The pattern has persisted with the current Cabinet, where many 
of them have had public sector backgrounds.  
                                                
9 Even by 1987, the size of the Singapore Civil Service was 70,000, according to 




 The professional logic here refers to the central tasks of the public servant, 
which is to create policies objectively, considering the inputs from various 
stakeholders. Public servants undertake their work in a hierarchical setting, working 
under the direction of supervisors, and ultimately under the direction of the Permanent 
Secretary and the Cabinet minister in the respective ministries.  
 The analytical bases of the professional logic can be traced back to Weber's 
conceptions of the bureaucracy (see 1978: 956-963). Weber conceptualised 
bureaucracy as a rule-driven activity that defines the scope of work, and how it was to 
be done. There is often a hierarchy, where the superior supervises the subordinate. 
There is a distinction between the private and the public. The Singapore Public 
Service follows these norms. Job candidates for the Singapore Public Service follow a 
meritocratic system, where suitable people are assessed to be competent for the task 
before being allowed to join or promoted to higher ranks.  
 The professional logic in the state bureaucracy does not only consist of the 
Weberian premises. There are other elements relevant to the Singapore context. 
Gillian Koh has written about the bureaucratic rationality in the Singapore Public 
Service. Koh (1997) used Offe’s “three-tiered concept of bureaucratic rationality” as 
an analytical framework. The first tier resembles the Weberian premises of 
bureaucratic organisation; the second tier is of "systemic rationality" where 
"bureaucratic action" fulfils societal needs. The third tier is concerned with the 
consensus-building across stakeholders in society. These tiers of rationality largely 
reflect the tasks of the public servant.  
 The professional logic is also concerned with the control of knowledge and 
skills (Abbott 1988). As with professions, there is a code of ethics that govern he 




training institutions, and educational institutes that the Singapore Public Service 
recognises, and where public servants can go to for further training. There is then, a 
set of worldviews that differ from other large companies that also have state 
bureaucracy.  
 While the public service works by and large on these notions of bureaucratic 
organisation and rationality, there are still leading organisations that exemplify these 
norms. The leading organisations for these norms within the Singapore Public Service 
are the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Prime Minister's Office (PMO). They are 
the leading organisations for the professional logics here as they are the sites of policy 
negotiations, and the foremost instance of the "systemic rationality" that public 
servants have to demonstrate. Rather than focusing on a specific area of need, 
bureaucrats in the MOF and PMO have to consider issues across different domains 
and prioritise them according to national objectives. MOF is where the budgetary 
decisions are made, deciding how financial resources are allocated across different 
domains. PMO is where policy coordination is conducted across different policy 
domains. The PMO is where the final decisions are made, with the authority of the 
Prime Minister's authority resting on the department.  
 There are several sources of legitimacy for the state bureaucracy and the 
attendant professional logic. The state bureaucracy obtains legitimacy upwards from 
the politicians. Politicians need the bureaucracy to perform the roles of the state.  A 
well-performing bureaucracy that is capable of implementing policies will earn the 
trust of the politicians. Else, politicians have greater right to intrude into the 
bureaucracy, interfering more heavily with appointment positions, or even attempt to 
create a parallel system to check on the bureaucracy. The state bureaucracy also 




goodwill that from the public, and obtain public support for a particular public 
service.  
 The state bureaucracy has a hierarchical authority structure, with the 
Permanent Secretary at the apex. Those at the top are respected for their seniority, and 
their ability for sound judgment. The state bureaucracy also obtains authority through 
technical competence and the accomplishment of state projects. The politicians rely 
on the state bureaucracy for the technical competence to get tasks accomplished; in 
turn the bureaucrats require politicians to carry the day in convincing the public of the 
necessity of any given project. While permanent secretaries have gone on to become 
politicians, this pattern is not as common when compared with the military.  
 
3.4 Politics in Singapore and the Political Logic 
 
  
 From the period after the Second World War to the 1970s, Singapore's 
political scene was contentious. The People's Action Party10 was a coalition of 
British-educated nationalists striving for independence and Communist supporters or 
sympathisers. The British and Malayan politicians were concerned that the 
Communist supporters would win, and worked with the British-educated faction led 
by Lee Kuan Yew to neutralise the Communist threat through arrests and exile, 
culminating in Operation Cold Store in 1963. Operation Cold Store arrested the top 
leaders in the Barinas Socialis and Partai Rakyat - then opposition parties (Trocki 
2006). By 1970, remaining pro-Communist activists were no longer active in the 
scene, paving the way for a one-party state dominated by the PAP, led by Lee Kuan 
Yew and others (Rodan 1989).  
                                                
10 For a history of the People's Action Party, see Men in White, by Sonny Yap, 




 The developments post-1970s are of interest here, as the PAP began to 
institutionalise its own rule. In this context, Singapore has been described as an 
administrative state, one that Chan Heng Chee described in 1975 as having had the 
locus of politics moved from among the political parties to within the state 
bureaucracy. This was the result of the PAP having dominated Singapore politics 
from 1959. By creating institutions tied to the state, the PAP has been able to use 
those advantages, winning elections by a large margin. The PAP was able to co-opt 
labour unions into its fold.11 As a result, the PAP is able to place senior party figures 
as heads of the unions. This process began in the 1980s with Lim Chee Onn becoming 
the secretary-general (Rodan 1989), followed by Ong Teng Cheong (ibid), and this 
pattern has persisted since then. At present, former Army chief Chan Chun Sing is the 
secretary-general of the NTUC, and is in the Cabinet, holding the appointment of 
Minister without Portfolio.  
 The PAP became a Leninist-like cadre party in 1957 (Yap, Lim and Leong   
2010) where leaders selected cadres, and the cadres selected the leaders at least in its 
party organisation. This arrangement came into being after an episode where the 
Communist left of the PAP almost seized power through internal party democratic 
processes. 12 The cadre arrangement would prevent future infiltrations (Yap et. al. 
2010). The PAP did not pursue a full-blown Leninist party in the sense of its ideology 
or in its penetration of in society and business. Unlike the Taiwanese Kuomintang 
(KMT) that was also a Leninist party in organisation, the PAP did not establish party 
                                                
11 This happened in the wider context of anti-Communist struggles in the 1960s. The 
PAP formed a separate union, the National Trades Union Congress, while the Left 
formed a separate Singapore Association of Trade Unions (SATU) (Rodan, 1989). 
SATU was later de-registered, and its executives arrested in the 1963 Operation Cold 
Store. The transition between Lim and Ong can be found in Rodan 1989:157-160. 





cells in major companies, although it did establish grassroots organisations to 
maintain political links with residential areas. The PAP can thus be considered to be a 
selectively-Leninist organisation.13   
 From the late 1970s onwards, Lee Kuan Yew established the pattern of 
selecting people from the state bureaucracy and the military as the core of Singapore’s 
political leadership in the PAP (Barr 2006; Lee, Kuan Yew 2000). As of 2016, the 
majority of the current Cabinet ministers have come from military or the civil service, 
with 4 ministers (out of 20) having no prior public sector experience.14 Of particular 
note is how 6 Cabinet ministers were former military officers,15 and 4 were former 
principal private secretaries to senior political figures.16   
 Political changes have changed to address the issue of succession. The Cabinet 
has increased in size over the decades, from 10 in 1965 to 20 in 2016. The increase in 
size is due to the need to incorporate successive generations of political leaders to 
replace existing leaders. As such, a hierarchy has developed, as places are created to 
fit in junior ministers alongside senior ministers. While the original Cabinet was 
largely a collection of peers, subsequent Cabinets developed hierarchy. In 1965, there 
were the position of Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister. By 1985, Senior 
Minister position had been created. The positions "Acting Minister" and "Second 
Minister" were included, denoting a hierarchy. Alongside this, the head of the union – 
the Secretary-General of the National Trades Union Congress (NTUC), entered the 
Cabinet under the title of "Minister without Portfolio". The position of “coordinating 
                                                
13 The PAP never established a parallel commissar system in the military or the 
bureaucracy as the Taiwanese KMT did. See Cheng (1989). 
14 They are Dr Ng Eng Heng, K Shanmugan, Masagos Zulkifli, and Grace Fu. S 
Iswaran, and Gan Kim Yong have private sector experiences, but had started out from 
the public sector.  
15 Lee Hsien Loong, Teo Chee Hean, Lim Hng Kiang, Chan Chun Sing, Tan Chuan-
Jin and Ng Chee Meng.  




minister”, first used in the security context has increased in usage over the years, 
creating more roles in the Cabinet.  
 The political logic has to do with PAP's style of governance, and the 
preservation of the PAP in power. The style of PAP's governance can be described as 
elitist. Lee Kuan Yew believed in that there was always a small group of people in 
society with the ability to shape society. He saw that his task was to ensure that those 
small group of people be identified and socialised into becoming political leaders (Lee 
2011). Throughout the history of the PAP, the public service was always a site from 
where political leaders could be identified and enrolled into the party (see Barr 2008). 
The political logic in the state bureaucracy thus refers to how the pattern for 
identifying political talent in the public service appears to have been institutionalised. 
Within the public service, there is a select of group of people who routinely interact 
with political figures. Particular bureaucrats could then be socialised in the political 
realm, and then enter it. Not all bureaucrats socialising with the political figures will 
become politicians, though many will naturally become more attuned to political 
demands. The political logic thus refers to the broader resonance in relating to the 
ideals of the PAP. For the case of Singapore, the PAP has become so dominant, that 
bureaucrats become used to it as the default.  
 The political logic in the state bureaucracy is most crystallised in the position 
of the Principal Private Secretary - the PPS. The PPS works only for senior political 
leaders - the Prime Minister (PM), the Senior Minister (SM), the Minister Mentor 
(MM), and on occasions, the Deputy Prime Minister. The PPS function as the point of 
contact between the political office holders with the rest of the bureaucracy. This 
means that the PPS spends a lot of time with the politicians, and inevitably becomes 




Boon Wan (PPS to PM Goh Chok Tong; entered politics in 2001), Heng Swee Keat 
(PPS to SM Lee Kuan Yew; entered politics in 2011), Lawrence Wong (PPS to PM 
Lee Hsien Loong; entered politics in 2011), Ong Ye Kung (PPS to PM Lee Hsien 
Loong; entered politics in 2015), and Chee Hong Tat (PPS to MM Lee Kuan Yew; 
entered politics in 2015). Four of them have since entered the Cabinet. 
 The mission of the political logic is to ensure that people in power ensure 
Singapore's economic prosperity, maintain the elite control of politics, maintaining 
Singapore's multi-ethnic and multi-religious character, and to remain open to the 
world. This is a political system that accepts diversity and equality of treatment 
regardless of ethnicity, language and religion. These starting assumptions already 
distinguish Singapore from her neighbouring countries, where equality of treatment of 
minority groups does not exist. I will come back to this point later in this section.  
 As PAP is the current governing party, the PAP seeks to remain in power by 
recruiting people it deems to be talented, who share these basic assumptions, and have 
them enter politics. The selection process has been described to be a agonising 
experience (Lee 2011: 101). Lee Kuan Yew has detailed the personnel selection 
mechanism, at times admitting that it was elitist, though he claimed that was how 
social dynamics work out in society (ibid). The selection process has gone through 
several iterations. At first there was an emphasis on academic ability, followed by the 
introduction of psychological assessments, after Lee was inspired by the experience of 
the Apollo 13 astronauts who encountered problems during their space mission (Lee, 
Kuan Yew 2000). Lee eventually found about how Shell company made their human 





 The basis of legitimacy for the political logic comes from senior political 
figures who have the responsibility of identifying potential candidates for election. 
The people they select cannot just be intellectually rigorous, but also need to have 
political acumen and understand what is politically possible. They also need to be 
personable, given how the role demands constant social interactions.  
 The sources of authority for the political logic then come from intellectual 
ability and political acceptance - from the public they serve but also from the 
grassroots leaders who help them in campaigning and governing. Their intellectual 
ability is ascertained from their academic performance in their education, and from 













































































These four logics coexist within the public service, although a hierarchy is 
very clear via the movement of leadership. It is the military-security personnel that 
move to the civilian bureaucracy. Neither is it the case that leaders of these public 
agencies work their way up to the top. The leaders of several public agencies are 
instead, rotated from other agencies, many of whom come from the military. The 
study revolves around this trend, leading to the argument that the military-security 
logic exists and dominates the Singapore state bureaucracy. There are instances of 
individuals moving across different institutional orders, even if they started out 
mainly in the military-security logic. For example, individuals in MINDEF can enter 
the economic agencies and then become a PPS. Less common is the pathway from the 
economic agencies to MINDEF.  
There is a hierarchy among the logics. In describing the logics and their 
hierarchy I will also address some of the previous work done on the Singapore state, 
such as such as Michael Barr's description of the hierarchy of policy domains. Barr 
had described a hierarchy of the important ministries. At the top were the Prime 
Minister’s Office, followed by the Ministry of Defence, then Education, Finance, 
Trade and Industry, and Home Affairs (Barr 2008: 61).   
While Barr wrote about the hierarchy of ministries, I suggest that the 
institutional logics provide a better basis for describing what the Singapore state 
prioritises at the organisational level. Furthermore, this study will be about the use of 
executive succession to provide a justification for the claims of inter-organisational 
hierarchy, something that was lacking in Barr’s hierarchy.  
The question of the dominance of the military-security logic has remained 
unanswered in the literature on Singapore. I suggest that the military-security domain 




Singapore. This vulnerability has its origins from the entry of Singapore into the 
Malaysian Federation when the political culture of the PAP came into conflict with 
the ethnic politics in Malaysia. This difference in political culture sharpened during 
independence, when Singapore needed to find an independent existence, both 
politically and economically. In the period immediately after 1965, there was a strong 
sense of vulnerability as Singapore did not have an independent military and 
Malaysian troops were still in Singapore, while Singapore's own forces were stationed 
in Sabah (Lee, Kuan Yew 2000:16). The cause of the split had been political - 
politicians in Malaysia and in Singapore had pursued very different visions of the 
nation-state. Whereas politicians in Malaysians had chosen a race-based path to the 
nation, Singapore had chosen a multiracial path instead, as reflected in the kinds of 
political parties that were to govern the country. In Malaysia, political parties were 
organised on racial lines; hence there were political parties for Malay, Chinese, and 
Indians respectively. UMNO, representing Malays in Malaysia - the majority racial 
group, would go on to become the dominant political party in the national coalition - 
Barisan Nasional - the umbrella group consisting of the other ethnic parties.  
 In Singapore however, the People's Action Party, although Chinese 
dominated, would become a multiracial party, as evident in the initial Cabinet, with 
representation from all the races in Singapore. The Singapore political landscape 
eschewed the organisation of political parties along racial or religious lines. Singapore 
diplomat and former Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bilahari 
Kausikan put it thus in 2015: 
 The basic issue in our relations with our immediate neighbours, and in varying 
degrees with other countries in Southeast Asia, is not what we do but what we 
are: the implicit challenge that, by its very existence, a Chinese majority 
Singapore organized on the basis of multiracial meritocracy poses to systems 





That we have the temerity to be more successful, adds to the offence. But we 
have no other choice. 
 
The maintenance of a substantial military force in Singapore society, seen in 
this light, is a way to protect Singapore's political culture while sandwiched between 
two larger neighbours with their own political cultures. The purpose for survival and 
strength against military threats is a theme that resonates in the cases of South Korea 
and Taiwan. South Korea and Taiwan did not pursue economic development as an 
end in itself. Economic developments in both countries were based on political 
necessity and survival. In South Korea, Park Chung Hee’s vision of a strong South 
Korea was in large part influenced by the Japanese nationalism that he had 
encountered as a solider serving in the Japanese military (Moon and Jun, 2011). 
Similarly, Chiang's desire for economic growth was premised on political reasons for 
survival, in both economic and military terms (Chu and Lin, 2001). Furthermore, the 
South Korean drive for Heavy and Chemical Industries (HCI) was partly motivated by 
the America's then-wavering commitment to South Korea's defence (Woo-Cumings 
1998). Democratisations in these two countries have since dampened the military 
logics as political parties have to compete in elections and offer attractive policies to 
the electorate. Reminders about the vulnerability of their respective countries might 
not be well heeded, given how they are associated with the authoritarian past. 
However, the same has not happened to Singapore. The PAP continues to be the 
dominant political party in Singapore; opposition parties have not been able to attract 
mass support as the PAP have done; as a result the military-security logic remains 
dominant in Singapore society. There is a counterfactual here, to which you shall 
come back in the conclusion to close the circle. Had Singapore been more 




 In this thesis, I focus on the effect of the military-security logic on the state 
bureaucracy and political spheres, although it certainly affects the rest of society. I 
look at Gorski's study of the Calvinist influence in state formation in the Netherlands 
and Prussia from the 1500s to the 1600s (Gorski 1993). The strong state that emerged 
in Prussia and in the Dutch republic, as Gorski argued, was partly due to the religious 
movements that took root in these societies. As Calvinism emphasised social 
discipline, and as the Prussian and Dutch states began to incorporate Calvinism into 
their bureaucracies, strong states emerged. Singapore can also be conceptualised as a 
disciplined society that focuses on the theme of survival. This theme of survival can 
be gleaned from quotes of Lee Kuan Yew, such as this one: 
 I am often accused of interfering in the private lives of citizens. Yes, if I did 
not, had I not done that, we wouldn’t be here today. And I say without the 
slightest remorse, that we wouldn’t be here, we would not have made 
economic progress, if we had not intervened on very personal matters – who 
your neighbour is, how you live, the noise you make, how you spit, or what 




 This theme of discipline has been noted in several areas in the literature in 
Singapore. Chua (1995) has noted the linkage between survival, pragmatism and 
discipline (together with other related values, and how connections were made 
between discipline at the individual level, to economic development at the national 
level. Chua noted how there were policy implications, such as with the subordination 
of labour to politics. Similarly, Rodan (1989) noted how the conditions of stress in the 
years after independence resulted in an “ideology of survival” that “stressed a number 
of inter-related values: discipline, resilience, achievement-orientation, adaptability, 
patriotism and self-sacrifice.” (p. 90) The military-security logic thus pervades even 
economic development. The connections made in the academic literature about 




influence was also evident in how senior staff in the military bureaucracy – Philip 
Yeo and Lim Siong Guan, to name two – made their way into the economic agencies. 
The themes of survival and vulnerability, emphasised in the military-security domain,  
were applied to the economic domains, and evidenced by the rotation of staff. I will 
show these in the subsequent sections detailing the flows of personnel and in the 
executive succession of the significant agencies.  
 Further investigations into the interplay of the different logics in society could 
prove fruitful for further research; however here the focus is on the political and the 
state bureaucratic leadership, and I turn to these in the later sections.  
With these ideas in mind about the logics that exist in the Singapore state, I 
offer the following arguments, which will be empirically substantiated in the 
subsequent chapters.  
 The argument here is that the military-security logic is dominant in the 
Singapore state owing to the concerns of physical vulnerability and survival, as felt by 
the first generation of political leaders and perpetuated over the subsequent decades. 
The influence of the military-security logic is visible through the rotations of military 
officers into the state bureaucracy, the economic agencies and into the political 
sphere. The military-security logic influences even the economic and political 
domains, as they are thought to be areas crucial to the survival of Singapore. This 
point is important given that multiple policy domains were all developing rapid in the 
early years of Singapore's independence. Although the economy and the military were 
important areas, the basic public goods of education, healthcare and housing were all 
pursued simultaneously. Given the large-scale development of each of these 
processes, there should be several officers from each of these domains who would 




scale to rival those that were happening in the military and in economic development. 
That the rapid developmental processes did not throw up leadership from the 1980s 
onwards reflects the existence of other factors leading to the preferential selection of 
personnel with backgrounds in the military and security domains. 
 There are alternative arguments. Institutional orders have their own succession 
processes. This is evident in the literature (Fligstein 1987; Thornton 2004; Thornton 
and Ocasio 1999). Given that the Singapore state is influenced by several institutional 
orders, they should have their own patterns of executive succession. If the institutional 
orders are nearly equal with each other, then I should observe distinct executive 
succession patterns for major policy domains. In an ideal case, I should see one 
distinct pathways for medical doctors in the health sector; one pathway for engineers; 
yet another pathway in the economic agencies, and so on. I should expect that 
outcome if the different policy domains and institutional logics had roughly the same 
influence as each other.  
 Still yet another possibility is the existence of a single logic that dominates 
across the different policy domains. In other words, there is only one institutional 
logic that replaces the military-security, economic or political logic. In such a 
situation, the career background of the personnel is not a factor of consideration for 
the leadership post. This appears to have happened with the elite in France, especially 
with their top bureaucrats and business executives and politicians.  
To be clear, these arguments cannot be tested statistically owing to the lack of 
sufficient number of cases ensuring minimum degrees of freedom for statistical 
studies. However, the arguments above capture trends that can be quantitatively 




I will show in the thesis that internal ladders of succession do not happen often 
in significant agencies. Rather, the personnel representing the military-security logics 
become leaders in the significant state agencies and in politics. This is the main 
evidence for the influence for the dominance of the military-security logic and I will 










This study employs the use of historical records to create a description of the 
trends that have occurred in the leadership movements.  
To perform the analysis, I obtained data from the Singapore Government 
Directory. The Directory has been published since the colonial era, although I start 
with the data in the 1960s till 2010, when its publication ceased. The Directory for 
current public service officers is available online, but there are no online archival 
sources. The Directory has seen several changes in its publication format and printing 
publication. In the 60s and 70s, it was printed quarterly, before becoming a twice-
annually publication up till 2010. 
 I tracked the data of various permanent secretaries back in time across their 
careers as appearing in the Directory. Their career biographies are crosschecked with 
available press releases and with other official sources.  
 There are several shortcomings of the Directory. The data available from the 
60s and 70s are not reliable, and one can only obtain a broad sense of who the 
officials were for which ministries. The unreliability is attributed to how the records 
were kept. Different years were bundled together and presented as a single year. 
Owing to the limitations of time, I could not unbundle the years from one another. 
Data was also missing, with entire ministries omitted. The dataset starts from 1980 to 
2010 annually. There was a gap from 2010 to 2015, as the Directories were no longer 
published. The data from 2010 to 2016 comes from press releases.  
 The Directory does not have records of military personnel, nor members of the 
covert intelligence services. However, their career record does become visible when 





 The names, appointment and organisations are captured in a database. The rest 
of the data analysis comes from the mining of this dataset to determine the entire 
career trajectories of individuals, and to follow the sequence of top executives in an 
organisation. Knowing the gains and the limits of the data collection methodology, we 
can now proceed to the actual data.  
 As previously mentioned, both Thornton (2004) and Fligstein (1984) have 
argued that changes in institutional logics can translate into particular patterns of 
executive succession. I will use this approach to look at the career trajectories of 
senior bureaucrats in the Singapore Public Service.  
 I look at the backgrounds of the senior bureaucrats who become leaders in the 
various agencies of the Singapore Public Service. By looking at their career 
backgrounds, I am able to find out in what organisations they have spent much of 
their careers in. I track the tenure of the executive and the institutional logics that 
he/she represents. Across different individuals, I can derive the period in which the 
organisation has spent under a particular institutional logic.  
 I have also shortlisted the organisations that will be looked at for their 
leadership successions. I look at the career trajectories of the military service chiefs, 
the intelligence chiefs, and police officers. Thereafter, I look at the major economic 
agencies under the Ministry of Trade and Industry. I look at historically important 
agencies, such as the Infocomm Development Authority (IDA), the Housing 
Development Board (HDB), the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA), the Central 
Provident Fund Board (CPFB) and the Land Transport Authority (LTA). In the 
descriptions that follow after the table of leadership successions, I will elaborate on 









In the previous chapters, I laid out my puzzle and the argument for this thesis. 
I identified the significant presence of military officers in the political Cabinet and in 
the leadership of public agencies. I use this to argue that the military-security logic 
operates in the wider Singapore society, and more specifically in the Singapore state – 
including both the bureaucracy and the politics. At independence, political leaders in 
Singapore have focused on the physical vulnerability of Singapore, necessitating rapid 
military development. Over time, this emphasis on vulnerability and the importance 
of the military has translated into military-influenced executive succession patterns in 
the state bureaucracy, in politics and in wider society. Here in this thesis, I focus on 
the state bureaucracy and politics, and future research can study the wider societal 
implications of the military-security logic identified here.  
In this chapter, I provide evidence for the domination of the military-security 
logic in the leadership of the state bureaucracy and in politics.  By looking at career 
rotations of senior military officers, and the executive succession of select state 
agencies. The flow of this chapter will be organised as such: I will look at the 
composition of former-military officers in Cabinet. I will then look at the rotation of 
the respective military service chiefs, and subsequently, a listing of senior military 
officers into the bureaucracy. The aim of these lists is to show the comprehensiveness 
of this rotation; that military officers have moved into vastly different policy domains, 
many of which have little to do with military matters.   
I will also do the same for the intelligence agencies – the Security and 




the career rotations of police officers, and how they have followed the military 
officers into the civilian bureaucracy.  
 After presenting the evidence for the outward rotation of personnel 
representing the military-security logic, I will provide a table on the influence of the 
different logics for the various public sector agencies. By computing the tenures of the 
leaders, and labelling them by their career history, I am able to provide a global 
perspective of how the various agencies have been under the leaders representing 
different institutional logics in the Singapore state.  
 I will look at the different logics in turn - I show the extensiveness of the 
military-security logic, followed by the economic logic, the political logic, and the 
professional logic. The treatment of each of these logics are different - since the logics 
are overlapping, and a single organisation can become the host for leaders of different 
logics in different periods of time. For some of these logics I will focus more on the 
careers of these officers instead, rather than the organisations, and also because there 
are few organisations where the political logic is explicit. I will then examine the 
agencies where the professional logic has been maintained.  
 For the organisations assessed to be influenced by the military-security and 
economic logics, I will provide tables describing the leaders of the organisations. In 
those sections I provide footnotes that briefly summarise the careers of the leaders 
involved.  
I will provide further evidence for the dominance of the military-security logic 
by showing the preference for personnel representing the military-security logic 
during agency restructuring. When public agencies undergo structural changes, 
personnel from the military-security logic are frequently employed to head the agency 




I will then end this section by pointing out how the dominance of the military-
security logic has not been a fully secured one, and that there have been tensions with 
the other logics that influence the Singapore state.  
Earlier in this thesis, I had already provided evidence for military officers in 
the Cabinet. Here, I will list the military officers who have entered politics.  
Table 6. List of Cabinet Ministers with prior military backgrounds 
Name  Year entered politics Year entered Cabinet 
Lee Hsien Loong 1984 1987 
George Yeo 1988 1990 
Teo Chee Hean 1992 1996 
Lim Hng Kiang 1991 1995 
Lui Tuck Yew 2006 2010 
Chan Chun Sing 2011 2011 
Tan Chuan-Jin 2011 2014 
Ng Chee Meng 2015 2016 
 
 
 While the absolute number of entrants in politics might be quite small, they 
have stayed in politics for a long time. Of the personnel on this list, only George Yeo 
and Lui Tuck Yew have left politics, while Chan Chun Sing, Tan Chuan-Jin and Ng 
Chee Meng are new entrants and are only starting on their political careers. What this 
means is that the Cabinet will continue to have a significant fraction of people from 
the military, and that the military will continue to be a source of politicians.  
5.1 Career Rotations of Military, Intelligence and Police officers 
  
 In this section I will present evidence for the widespread rotation of personnel 
from the military to the bureaucracy. I begin first with the senior military officers – 







Table 7. Career Trajectories of Chiefs of Army  
Name Chief of Army CDF? Post-military career 
Winston Choo 1974-1990 1 Diplomat 
Boey Tak Hap 1990 0 CEO SMRT 
Ng Jui Ping 1990-1992 1 Private Sector 
Lim Neo Chian 1992-1995 0 JTC, STB 
Han Eng Juan 1995-1998 0 CEO/LTA 
Lim Chuan Poh 1998-2000 1 PS/MOE 
Ng Yat Chung 2000-2003 1 Director/Temasek Holdings 
Desmond Kuek 2003-2007 1 PS/MEWR, CEO SMRT 
Neo Kian Hong 2007-2010 1 PS/MOE 
Chan Chun Sing 2010-2011 0 Politics 
Ravinder Singh 2011-2014 0 President, ST Kinetics 
Perry Lim 2014-2015 1 Incumbent CDF 
Melvyn Ong 2015-present NA NA 
Italicised names have entered politics. 
 
 
Italicised names have entered politics.  
 
 
Table 9. Career Trajectories of Chiefs of Air Force  
Name CAF tenure CDF Post-military 
career 
Michael Teo Eng 
Cheng 
1985-1992 0 Diplomat 
Bey Soo Khiang 1992-1995 1 Singapore Airlines 
(SIA) 
Goh Yong Siang 1995-1998 0 Temasek Holdings 
Raymund Ng Teck 
Heng 
1998-2001 0 Singapore Airlines 
Lim Kim Choon 
"Rocky" 
2001-2006 0 Civil Aviation 
Authority of 
Singapore (CAAS)  
Table 8. Career Trajectories of Chiefs of Navy  
Name CNV tenure Post-CNV Posting 
James Leo* -1991 Retired 
Teo Chee Hean 1991-1992 Politics 
Kwek Siew Jin 1992-1996 Public Service, National 
Council of Social Service 
Richard Lim Cherng Yih 1996-1999 CEO/DSTA 
Lui Tuck Yew 1999-2003 CEO HDB, Politics 
Ronnie Tay 2003-2007 CEO IDA; NEA 
Chew Men Leong 2007-2011 CEO PUB; LTA 
Ng Chee Peng 2011-2014 CEO CPF 




Ng Chee Khern 2006-2009 0 SID, PS/Health, 
PS/MOE 
Ng Chee Meng 2009-2013 1 Politics 
Hoo Cher Mou 2013-2016 0 Retired 
Mervyn Tan Wei 
Ming 
2016- NA Incumbent 
Italicised names have entered politics 
 
 
 The three military service chiefs have usually had second careers after their 
military service. They have ended up either in government-linked companies (GLCs) 
or the bureaucracy, or even politics. Some broad patterns are discernible. Air Force 
chiefs have joined aviation-related bodies (SIA and CAAS). Several service chiefs 
have gone on to have second careers in the bureaucracy, although Chan Chun Sing 
and Ng Chee Meng have been exceptions in entering politics immediately after their 
military careers.  
 The next table will show that the rotation of military staff to the civilian sector 

























Table 10. Career Summaries of senior Military Staff  
Name Year Career Summaries 
Tan Chin Tiong 1983 MHA 
Lai Seck Hui 1990 MTI 
Ho Meng Kit 1995 MTI, MOT, MICA, MFA 
Lam Joon Khoi 1998 MOE, MOF, MEWR, Minlaw 
Richard Lim 1999 MINDEF 
Philip Su 2001 JTC 
Yap Ong Heng 2004 Minlaw, MOT 
Loh Wai Keong 2005 MTI 
Lawrence Leong 2007 STB 
Hugh Reginald Lim 2009 Minlaw, MCCY 
Gary Ang Aik Hwang 2010 MINDEF, MTI, MEWR 
Tan Meng Dui 2011 MND 
Sim Gim Guan 2013 NCSS 
Ngien Hoon Ping 2013 MOF 
 
 Table 4 shows how the movement of military officers from the military to the 
civilian bureaucracy is a widespread phenomenon that started in the 1980s and 
increased in the 1990s. The officers come from all three services. The wide range of 
ministries they enter into indicates the widespread influence of the military-security 
logic in the state bureaucracy, where military officers are deemed to be suitable for 
most areas of administration.  
 In the next series of tables, I examine the career trajectories of the heads of the 






Table 11. Career Trajectories of ISD Directors  
Name Year ISD director Post-ISD posting 
Tjong Yik Min 1986-1993 PS/Communications 
Chiang Chie Foo 1993-1997 2PS/MOE 
Benny Lim 1997-2003 PS/MHA 
Pang Kin Keong 2003-2010 PS/MOT 







Table 12. Career Trajectories of SID Directors  
Name Year SID director Post-SID posting 
S R Nathan 1971-1979 PS/MFA 
Eddie Teo 1979-1994 PS/MINDEF 
Joseph Koh 1994-1995 Diplomat 
Choi Shing Kwok 1995-2005 PS/MOT, MEWR 
Chee Wee Kiong 2005-2010 2PS/MFA 
Ng Chee Khern 2010-2014 PS/MINDEF, 2PS/Health 
 
 
 A few observations can be made about the career trajectories of the 
intelligence chiefs. For one, the position of the intelligence chief is itself very close in 
rank to an actual PS, given how most of the heads of the intelligence agencies become 
permanent secretary after their stint. Note also how the being the head of the 
intelligence agency can lead to a variety of postings, such as in the area of transport, 
education or health. The pattern of these sets of rotation underlies the influence of the 
military-security logic.  
  
 
Table 13. Career Trajectories of Police Commissioners  
Name Tenure Post-Police Career 
Goh Yong Hong 1979-1992 Private sector 
Tee Tua Ba 1992-1997 Ambassadorships 
Khoo Boon Hui 1997-2010 Advisor to MHA 
Ng Joo Hee 2010-2015 PUB 
Hoong Wee Teck 2015- Incumbent 
 
 
Table 14. Singapore Police Force Officers in the Administrative Service 
Name Year attained PS Singapore Police Force Overseas 
Scholarship Recipients 
Heng Swee Keat 2002 1980 
Leo Yip 2005 1982 
Aubeck Kam 2012 1989 
 
 The two tables show how senior police officers also enter the civilian 




contains the list of police commissioners, and the second table is a list of police 
officers who have joined the administrative service and have become permanent 
secretaries. Heng Swee Keat has since entered politics and entered Cabinet. This 
shows that the police force might be part of the military-security logic.  
 These series of tables have demonstrated one component of the dominance of 
the military-security logic in the Singapore state bureaucracy. I have shown that the 
military, the intelligence agencies, and the police are part of the military-security 
logic, and that senior personnel from these agencies are routinely rotated to the 
civilian bureaucracies, even those that have little to do with military or security 
affairs.  
 In the next section I will go on to demonstrate the full extent of the dominance 
































Table 15. List of Agencies with Leaders from Military-Security backgrounds 
















1.000 7 Security 













0.743 35 Economic 
MTI Agency for Science 
Technology and 
Research 
0.727 33 Economic 















Youth and Sports 
National Council of 
Social Service 












Youth and Sports 
Singapore Sports 
Council 
0.389 36 Social  





0.385 13 Social 








Fund Board chair 
0.333 36 Economic/So
cial 




Transport Authority /Economic 
Ministry of Law Intellectual Property 
Office of Singapore 








Ministry of Law Singapre Land 
Authority 
























Youth and Sports 
People's Association 0.167 36 Social 
Ministry of Trade 
and Industry 











and the Arts 
Media Development 
Authority CEO 
0.139 36 Economic 
Ministry of the 
Environment 
PUB CEO 0.139 36 Infrastructure
/Economic 
Ministry of Trade 
and Industry 
SPRING 0.100 20 Economic 











Fund Board CEO 
0.083 36 Economic/ 
Social 
 
 These table shows that a wide range of agencies have had leaders with a 
military background. Given the wide extent of the military-security logic, we will 
focus only only on the few agencies where the leaders with a background in the 
military-security logic represented more than half of the period of the study. The 




1. Casino Regulatory Authority; 
2. Economic Development Board (EDB) CEO; 
3. Infocomm Development Authority Chairperson; 
4. Agency for Science Technology and Research (ASTAR) Chairperson; 
5. EDB Chairperson; 
6. Land Transport Authority CEO; 
7. National Council of Social Services CEO. 
  
 While the dominance of the military-security logic in CRA is not surprising, 
given that it is after all, an agency under the Ministry of Home Affairs, the dominance 
of the military-security logic in the other agencies is more surprising, especially when 
considering that the lead agencies for economic development are also influenced. In 
addition, the military-security dominance in sports and in social services is also 
noteworthy. The SSC undertakes a whole range of activities, and at times, has to 
organise large sporting events, in addition to develop sports both for the community 
and professionally. NCSS provides funding for social services, overseeing the 
delivery of the welfare service. Both areas require working with numerous 
stakeholders. For the case of social services, the presence of a leadership aligned with 











Table 16. NCSS Leaders17 by Institutional Logic 
Name Tenure Military-Security 
Logic 
Professional Logic 
Chua Kok Piaw 1993 0 1 
Alex Lee Ka But 1993-1998 0 1 
Benedict 
Cheong 
1998-2007 1 0 
Ang Bee Lian 2007-2013 0 0 
Sim Gim Guan  2013- 1 0 
 
 The domiannce of the military-security logic in the area of economic 
development requires accounting for. In earlier sections of this thesis, I had placed 
them in different sections. During the early years of Singapore's independence, they 
did have distinct leadership, especially as the SAF was still developing. By the 1980s 
however, staff that had experience in developing the military moved over to the 
economic domains and other policy domains. Philip Yeo moved over to EDB and 
stayed there for close to two decades, while personnel who were involved with the 
computerisation of the military also entered into the civilian sectors, forming the 
National Computer Board (NCB), the predecessor to IDA. The military research 
effort was also to become a contributor to the research landscape in Singapore. The 
National Science and Technology Board (NSTB) was established to advance research 
and development in Singapore, and also overseeing research labs that had been 
established. ASTAR was only established when Philip Yeo advocated for a 
biomedical sciences to be integrated with the existing focus on engineering and other 






                                                
17 Other than Benedict Cheong and Sim Gim Guan, the other leaders were 
professionals. Benedict Cheong retired from the police as a Senior Assistant 



























Yeo Seng Teck -1985 0 0   




1 0 MD, NCB CEO, STB 
Lim Swee Say 1994-
1996 
1 0 EDB Chair, NCB 
Ho Meng Kit 1996-
1998 
1 1 DS MTI DS MTI 
Liew Heng San 1998-
2001 
0 1 DS PSD PS Law 
Ko Kheng Hwa 2001-
2009 
0 0 CEO JTC Private 
Sector 




0 0 EDB PS Law 
Yeoh Keat 
Chuan 





The two tables show the chairperson and chief executive successions for EDB. 
EDB was established in 1961 as an investment promotion and industry coordination 
                                                
18 Dr Tan Chin Nam started his career at MINDEF, as did Lim Swee Say. Yeo Seng 
Teck was a career officer who was later found out to have committed corruption. Ko 
Kheng Hwa was a SAFOS recipient who also started out at MINDEF as a systems 
engineer. Both Dr Beh Swan Gin and Yeoh Keat Chuan have spent most of their 
careers at EDB. 
Table 17. EDB Chairpersons’ tenures by Institutional Logics 
Name Years Military-Security PPS 
Ngiam Tong Dow -1981 0 0 
P Y Hwang 1981-1984 0 0 
Philip Yeo 1984-1992 1 0 
Chan Chin Bock 1992-2003 (as co-
chair) 
0 0 
Philip Yeo 1992-2000 (as co-
chair) 
1 0 
Teo Ming Kian 2003-2006 1 0 
Lim Siong Guan 2006-2008 1 1 
Leo Yip 2008-2012 1 1 




agency – the pilot economic development agency in the parlance of the developmental 
states literature.   
 Looking at the patterns of chairperson and executive successions, EDB is 
dominated by the military-security logic, especially with the entry of Philip Yeo, who 
had been the PS at MINDEF previously. Philip Yeo went on to spend nearly 20 years 
as either the chairperson or the co-chairperson at EDB. The subsequent chairpersons - 
Teo Ming Kian, Lim Siong Guan and Leo Yip both had career backgrounds in the 
military or security sector. Teo Ming Kian was a defence engineer; Lim Siong Guan 
had spent 10 years being the permanent secretary at MINDEF, and Leo Yip had been 
a police officer. These appointments are one way that the military-security logic have 
come to influence personnel appointment. The career succession at the executives 
level has been different. Ho Meng Kit who was a navy chief, the other executives had 
spent their careers in the bureaucracy or at EDB. Lim Swee Say was an Singapore 
Armed Forces Overseas Scholarship recipient, who helped with early efforts at 
computerising MINDEF.  
That senior personnel from the military-security backgrounds have been 
appointed chairpersons rather than personnel from the economic domain reflects the 
way economic issues are perceived – that they are part of the overall strategy to 
manage Singapore’s vulnerability. One can imagine other possibilities in 
appointments and perspectives. Hypothetically, a retired industrialist, someone who 
has had a range of experience in the corporate world, could hold the chairpersonship. 
That these possibilities are left out reflects a specific view of how economic 








Table 19. Tenure of Chairpersons19 at Science Council/National Science and 





Prof Ang How Ghee* -1983 0 0 0 
Prof Choo Seok Cheow* 1983-1990 0 0 0 
Lam Chuan Leong# 1991-1992 1 0 1 
Teo Ming Kian# 1992-2000 1 0 0 
Philip Yeo 2001-2007 1 1 0 
Lim Chuan Poh 2007- 1 0 0 
 
 The Agency for Science Technology and Research (A*STAR) is the current 
agency for managing research with the ultimate aim for economic development. 
A*STAR's predecessor agencies were the NSTB, and prior to that, the Science 
Council. I focus on the more recent history from the NSTB era onwards.  
 The patterns for chairpersonship and executive successions for A*STAR are 
similar to EDB, in the sense that the chairpersonship shows the dominance of the 
military-security logic, while the executive succession shows the presence of the 
economic logic. A*STAR chairpersons have had careers related to military 
development, while the executives are a mixture of career bureaucrats, former 
economic staff, and research personnel. As with EDB, the chairperson is an active 
position and is more senior than the executives. That the A*STAR chairperson is 
someone representing the military-security logic means that scientific and 
technological research is also seen through the lens of political strategy. As with 
broader economic development, research is seen as a tool to manage Singapore’s 
vulnerability. An alternative conception could mean research through the professional 
researchers’ lens of knowledge for its own sake.  
 
                                                
19 Prof Ang How Ghee and Prof Choo Seok Cheow were academics. Lam Chuan 





Table 20. Tenure of Executives20 at Science Council/National Science and 




EDB Professional  
Siew Weng Yin* 1981-1990 0 0 1 
Dr Vincent Yip* 1986-1990 0 0 1 
Dr Chou Siaw Kiang# 1990-1992 0 0 1 
Liew Mun Leong# 1992 0 0 1 
Leong Wai Leng# 1993 0 0 1 
Vijaykumar D Mehta# 1993-1996 0 0 1 
Gong Wee Lik# 1996-1997 0 1 0 
Chong Lit Cheong# 1998-2000 0 1 0 
Boon Swan Foo 2000-2006 0 1 0 
Yena Lim 2007-2010 0 0 1 
Low Teck Seng 2010-2012 0 0 1 





Infocomm Development Authority (IDA)  
 
Table 21. National Computing Board/Infocomm Development Authority 




Philip Yeo 1982-1986 1 1 0 
Dr Tan Chin Nam 1986-1995 1 1 0 
Lim Swee Say 1995-2000 1 1 0 
Lam Chuan Leong 2000-2008 1 0 1 
Yong Ying-I 2008-2015 0 0 1 




                                                
20 Siew Weng Yin, Dr Vincent Yip and Dr Chou Siaw Kiang were staff in the early 
Science Council. Dr Chou was also an academic, a professor at NUS. Liew Mun 
Leong was an engineer at the Public Works Department. Leong Wai Leng was an 
administrator before joining the Temasek Holdings.  See Hang et. al. (2016) The 





Table 22. National Computing Board/Infocomm Development Authority 




Ko Kheng Hwa 1992-1996 1 1 0 
Stephen Yeo Siew Chye 1996-1998 1 0 0 
Yong Ying-I 1999-2002 0 0 1 
Tan Ching Yee 2002-2005 0 0 0 
Chan Yeng Kit 2005-2009 1 0 0 
Ronnie Tay 2009-2013 1 0 0 
Steven Leonard 2013- 0 0 0 
Jacqueline Poh 2013- 0 0 0 
 
 
The executive succession of the Infocomm Development Authority illustrates 
how the military-security and economic logics coincide. Leaders of the IDA and its 
predecessor agencies have come from military-security(chairpersons) and economic 
domains (executives), with leaders from SAF/MINDEF and/or the EDB. Leaders of 
the IDA/predecessor agencies have also gone on to higher positions, as with Lim 
Swee Say, who has become a Cabinet member.   
The predecessor agency was the National Computer Board, charged with 
computerising the public service from the 1980s onwards. Philip Yeo, already a PS at 
MINDEF, was also the chairman. This demonstrates an early emphasis on new 
technologies by the government.  
Subsequent leadership figures such as Dr Tan Chin Nam, Ko Kheng Hwa and 
Lim Swee Say, have all served stints in MINDEF and/or at EDB. Subsequent leaders 
in the mid- to late-1990s were career professionals: Stephen Yeo Siew Chye, Michael 
                                                
21 Ko Kheng Hwa was formerly at the EDB. Stephen Yeo was from the Defence 
Technology Group. Chan Yeng Kit and Tan Ching Yee are bureaucrats who have 
rotated across government. Ronnie Tay was a former chief of navy. Jacqueline Poh 
was from the Administrative Service, while Steve Leonard was hired from the private 




Yap Kiam Siew and later as IDA, Leong Keng Thai. The National Computer Board 
also shifted across different ministries, from MOF, to MTI, and was then placed under 
the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology. In the 2000s, NCB 
was combined with elements of the Telecommunications Authority of Singapore to 
form the Infocomm Development Authority (IDA). The first chairperson was Lam 
Chuan Leong, while the first CEO was Yong Ying-I. Lam Chuan Leong had been 
PPS to PM Lee Kuan Yew, while Yong Ying-I served as PPS to then-DPM Lee Hsien 
Loong. The IDA remains important despite its status as a 'social' ministry under the 
Ministry of Communication and Information (MCI). However, this is set to change - 
MDA, the stautory board regulating and promoting the media industry, is slated to 
fully merge with IDA in 2016/7 to form IMDA and the Government Technology 
Agency. 
IDA's earlier history as NCB suggests that info-communications technology 
was viewed as a strategic priority in government requiring personnel who have had 
prior experience in managing large technological projects. Such personnel could be 
found mostly in the military establishment, which has had a long history of working 
with technology and at a large scale. Alternative patterns of succession could have 
seen technology leaders in the chief executive or chairperson role. That this happened 
less frequently demonstrates the influence of the military-security logic, and of the 








Table 23. Percentage of IDA Chairpersons and Executives(in person-years) by 
Institutional Logics 
 
Name Number of 
person-years 









Number of  
PPS-years 
(Percentage) 
IDA Chair 34 26 (76.5) 18 (52.9) 7 (20.6) 
IDA 
Executive 




Land Transport Authority - LTA 
 
Table 24. Land Transport Authority Executives'22 Tenures (in person-




Liew Heng San 1995-1998 0 1 1 
Han Eng Juan 1998-2003 1 0 0 
Ho Meng Kit 2003-2005 1 0 1 
Yam Ah Mee 2005-2010 1 0 0 
Chew Hock Yong 2010-2014 0 0 0 
Chew Men Leong 2014-16 1 0 0 
 
 
Land Transport Authority (LTA) is the amalgamation of several agencies that 
dealt with different parts of land transport. LTA absorbed a portion of the Road 
Works department from the old Public Works Department, which was privatised. The 
new entity also provided oversight for the developing rail industry at that time. Buses 
were also brought under LTA, along with the Registry of Vehicles. LTA leaders have 
included military chiefs, such as Han Eng Juan. One of the contributing agencies to 
                                                
22 Ho Meng Kit was a senior navy officer, while Chew Hock Yong was from the 




LTA was the body tasked to develop the Mass Rapid Transit system. One of the early 
leaders of this MRT corporation was Wesley d'Aranjo, himself a former senior 
military officer in the army.  
 The presence of several consecutive former military leaders at LTA instead of 
career engineers shows the influence of the military-security logic. While there might 
conceivably be other reasons why military leaders are suitable for the role, the 
absence of internally-promoted leaders at LTA shows that land transportation is seen 







Table 25. Percentage of Land Transport Authority Executives' Tenures (in person-
years) by Institutional Logics 










Number of  
PPS-years 
(percentage) 




 The influence of the military-security logic also goes beyond these few 
agencies. I will not go through the leadership history of all the agencies here in this 
section; I instead will go through some the leadership histories of the other agencies 
that were significant in the developmental narrative of Singapore - such as the 
Housing Development Board (HDB), Urban Development Authority (URA), and the 
Central Provident Fund Board (CPFB), People's Association among others, and I will 
do so in a subsequent section looking at how organisations can reflect the influence of 








5.3 Economic Logic and the Economic Agencies 
 
 In this next session, I will look into the economic agencies.  
 
Table 26. List of Agencies influenced by the Economic Logic 
Ministries Statutory Boards proportion 
economics 
Total years in 
study 
MTI IES 0.706 34 
MTI SPRING 0.650 20 
MTI JTC CEO 0.500 36 
MTI ASTAR CEO 0.257 35 
MTI EDB ceo 0.226 31 
MTI EDB chair 0.200 35 




and the Arts 
IDA ceo 0.167 24 
MTI STB CEO 0.094 32 
Ministry of 
Manpower 
CPF chair 0.083 36 
    
 
 
 This table shows that the economic logic is concentrated in the economic 
agencies, although there are still other non-economic agencies that have had EDB-
related staff. The cases for IDA and CPF are due to rotations of leaders who were 























 JTC Corporation is the statutory board responsible for the planning of 
industrial estates and infrastructure. JTC Corporation was a former subunit within 
EDB and was spun out. The executive is more important than the chairperson, and is 
the focus here.  
 The executive successions of JTC Corporation show that the economic logic is 
more visible than the military-security logic. Only Lim Neo Chian represents the 
military-security logic in that he was a former army chief. The other executives and 
chairpersons have worked at EDB or were from the bureaucracy. Of the list of 
executives, Ko Kheng Hwa, Chong Lit Cheong, Manohar Khiatani and Png Cheong 
Boon have all worked at EDB before. With JTC Corporation, the economic logic is of 
greater influence than the military-security logic.  
                                                
23 Tan Tian Boon retired from JTC. Francis Mak also retired from JTC and did not 
continue a career in the public service. Lim Neo Chian was a Chief of Army, while 
the rest had careers in EDB.  





Tan Tian Boon -1980 0 0 0 
Francis T K Mak 1981-1992 0 0 0 
David T E Lim 1992-1995 0 1 0 
Lim Neo Chian 1995-1997 1 0 0 
Ko Kheng Hwa 1997-2001 1 1 0 
Chong Lit Cheong 2001-2006 0 1 0 
Ow Foong Pheng 2006-2010 0 0 0 
Manohar Khiatani 2010-2013 0 1 0 









Table 28. Percentage of JTC Corporation Executives’ Tenures (in person-years) by 
Institutional Logics  
Name Number of 
person-years in 
the study 








JTC executive 36 - 6 (16.7) 18 (50.0) 
 
Singapore Tourism Board (STB) 
 





K C Yuen -1984 0 0 0 
Joseph Chew 1985-1989 0 0 0 
Pek Hock Thiam 1989-1994 0 0 0 
Dr Tan Chin Nam 1994-1998 1 0 0 
Yeo Khee Leng 1998-2001 0 0 0 
Lim Neo Chian 2001-2009 1 0 0 
Aw Kah Peng 2009-2012 0 1 0 
Lionel Yeo 2012- 0 0 0 
 
 STB was initially the Singapore Tourism Promotion Board, and later became 
the Singapore Tourism Board in 1997. The executives of STB are more important 
than the chairpersons, and are the subject of focus here. The military-security logic is 
present here via Lim Neo Chian, while the other executives represent the professional 
                                                
24 K C Yuen was from the private sector. Joseph Chew has worked n the Singapore 
Tourism Promotion Board. Pek Hock Thiam was a career bureaucrat and later Deputy 
Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Yeo Khee Leng has had a career in both 




or the economic logics. Aw Kah Peng spent her career at EDB, while Lionel Yeo is a 
bureaucrat. The chief executives have often been external to STB – they have entered 
STB from other government agencies. There is no single dominant logic in STB; 




Table 30. Percentage of Singapore Tourism Board (STB) Executives' Tenures (in 
person-years) by Institutional Logics 
Name Number of 
person-years 

















32 12 (37.5) 4 (12.5) 0  
 




                                                
25 Ridzwan Dzafir was a career civil servant when IE Singapore was still the Board of 
Trade under MOF. Ng Pock Too, Yeo Seng Teck, Lee Yi Shyan, Chong Lit Cheong 
and Teo Eng Cheong worked at EDB before being transferred elsewhere. Barry 
Desker had a career in diplomacy at MFA. Lee Ark Boon is a career bureaucrat.  
Table 31. International Enterprises Singapore executives'125 tenures by 
Institutional Logics 
Name Years Military- EDB PPS 
Ridzwan Dzafir -1982 0 0 0 
Ng Pock Too 1982-1985 0 1 0 
Yeo Seng Teck 1985-1993 0 1 0 
Barry Desker 1993-2000 0 0 0 
Heng Swee Keat 2000-2001 0 0 1 
Lee Yi Shyan 2002-2006 0 1 0 
Chong Lit Cheong 2006-2011 0 1 0 
Teo Eng Cheong 2011-2015 0 1 0 




 International Enterprises Singapore was first formed as the Board of Trade in 
the Ministry of Finance. This BOT was renamed Trade Development Board, and 
became International Enterprises Singapore (IES) only in 2002. IE Singapore, like 
JTC, has received senior staff from the EDB. Among its CEOs are Lee Yi Shyan and 
Chong Lit Cheong. Three CEOs have gone on to enter politics: Ng Pock Too, Heng 
Swee Keat and Lee Yi Shyan. IE Singapore illustrates an example of an agency in the 
state bureaucracy that has not been influenced by the military-state logic to a 
significant degree. Instead, IE Singapore is an instance of how the economic logic has 
greater influence, exemplified by the presence of EDB officers.  
Table 32. Percentage of International Enterprises Singapore Executives' Tenures (in 
person-years) by Institutional Logics 
Name Number of 
person-years 











































SPRING has multiple responsibilities. SPRING looks after small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) and also has other responsibilities to do with setting standards and 
encouraging productivity. Its predecessor agencies include the National Productivity 
Board (NPB) and the Singapore Institute for Standards and Industrial Research 
(SISIR). Both were merged in 1996 to form the Singapore Productivity and Standards 
Board (PSB), later renamed SPRING Singapore. The chairpersons of SPRING have 
usually been politically influential – such as Lim Boon Heng who was secretary-
general of NTUC and Ho Ching, who was the chairperson of Singapore Technologies 
during that period in the 1990s. The executive positions have included career 
engineers. Although there is political attention on SPRING’s activities, of the leaders 
ever appointed to CEO, only one has become a PS. Philip Yeo was made the 
chairman of SPRING in 2007. While Philip Yeo has had an impressive biography, he 
                                                
26 Lee Suan Hiang and Png Cheong Boon had both worked in EDB before being 
transferred to SPRING Singapore. Loh Khum Yean’s and Poong Hong Yuen's 
backgrounds were in the Administrative Service, while Tan Kai Hoe was a former 
Navy Chief.  





Lee Suan Hiang 1996-2004 0 1 0 
Loh Khum Yean 2004-2008 0 0 0 
Png Cheong Boon 2008-2013 0 1 0 
Tan Kai Hoe 2013-2015 1 0 0 




does not have the same influence on executive functions in the organisation. The 
current CEO is a former DS at Minlaw and former CEO at NParks, Poon Hong Yuen, 
representing the professional logic.  
The executive succession for SPRING shows some influence from the 
military-security logic, with only Tan Kai Hoe coming from the military. Rather, 
SPRING is dominated by the professional logic, as bureaucrats from elsewhere in the 
public service are rotated to become SPRING’s executive.  
 
 
Energy Market Authority (EMA) and Public Utilities Board (PUB) 
 
 I consider the executive successions of both EMA and PUB together, owing to 
the fact that EMA was formerly the energy arm of a larger PUB.  
Table 35. Public Utilities Board chairpersons'27 tenures by Institutional Logics 
Name Years Military-Security EDB PPS 
Lee Ek Tieng -2000 0 0 0 






                                                
27 Lee Ek Tieng and Tan Gee Paw had spent most of their careers in environmental 
engineering. Lee Ek Tieng was responsible for cleaning up the Singapore River 
Table 34. Percentage of SPRING Singapore Executives' Tenures (in person-years) 
by Institutional Logics 
Name Number of 
person-years in 
the study 



























EMA was once part of a larger PUB that managed Singapore's water and 
electricity supply. This PUB was split in two: one section specialising in water issues, 
                                                
28 Lee Yong Siang and Ong Ho Sim were both career engineers at the Public Utilities 
Board. Khoo Teng Chye spent his career at URA.  
29 Khoo Chin Hean was a career engineer at the Ministry of Environment. Lawrence 
Wong and Chee Hong Tat were both PPSes, and Ng Wai Choong is a career 
bureaucrat.  







Lee Yong Siang -1995 0 0 0 
Ong Ho Sim 1995-2002 0 0 0 
Khoo Teng Chye 2003-2011 0 0 0 
Chew Men Leong 2011-2015 1 0 0 
Ng Joo Hee 2015- 1 0 0 





Khoo Chin Hean 2006-2009 0 0 0 
Lawrence Wong 2009-2011 0 0 1 
Chee Hong Tat 2011-2015 0 0 1 
Ng Wai Choong 2015- 0 0 0 









Chiang Chie Foo 2006-2009 1 0 1 




and the other in energy management under MTI. These two entities are two different 
organisations. PUB now manages the entire water supply in Singapore - from water 
production, sewerage, flood control, rainwater collection and desalination. EMA on 
the other hand does not own any energy production plant. This was because the power 
stations were sold off to private companies, and also because Singapore has no native 
energy production capacity. Singapore's energy supplies come from natural gas 
pipelines from Indonesia and Malaysia, with energy plants owned by Indonesian and 
Malaysian companies.  
Career engineers led the PUB in both its historical and present form. Lee Yong 
Siang, a long-time CEO at PUB, joined PUB in the 1960s and stayed in the 
organisation. PUB's chair is now Tan Gee Paw, a career engineer and former PS for 
MEWR/MENV. However, the CEO successions have changed. Following Lee Yong 
Siang was Ong Ho Sim, a career engineer, followed by Khoo Teng Chye, another 
career engineer, although in HDB. In 2011, this pattern of succession changed. Chew 
Men Leong, a former Chief of Navy, replaced Khoo Teng Chye. In 2014, Ng Joo Hee, 
the police commissioner, replaced Chew Men Leong. Both men were uniformed 
professionals; Chew Men Leong from the Navy, and Ng Joo Hee from Police. This 
could signal a change in the influence of the institutional logics, with the role of water 
increasingly seen as a strategic resource. The alternative to consider here is for PUB 
to promote an experienced water engineer as the chief executive. That there has been 
a change in the executive succession pattern reflects changes in the influence of the 















5.4 Professional logic 
 
 This section describes the career trajectory of personnel representing the 
professional logics. While the military-security logic has a substantial influence in 
politics and in the state bureaucracy, the professional logic remains of some influence.  
 There are two kinds of professionals to consider here. The first is the career 
professional, who spent much of their career within a single agency. These leaders 
have had deep knowledge by virtue of the tenure in the organisation. The second kind 
of professional to consider here is the leader who becomes the chief executive of the 
organisation due to an Administrative Service rotation.  
 The agencies representing the professional logic are the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) and the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). These are the central ministries where 
funding decisions are made, and where policies from other ministries are coordinated. 
These central ministries are where the trade-offs between policy domains are 
discussed, and reflect wider national goals and not just the parochial agency interest.  
Table 39. Percentage of PUB Chairpersons and Executives, EMA Chairpersons and 
Executives Chairpersons' and Executives Tenures (in person-years) by 
Institutional Logics 
 
Name Number of 
person-years in 
the study 











PUB Chair 16 0 0 0  
PUB Executive 20 5 (25.0) 0 1 (5.00)  
EMA Chair 10 3 (30.0) 0 0  
EMA 






Table 40. List of Agencies with solely Professional Logics 
Ministry Agency 
Ministry of Community Development, 
Youth and Sports 
Majilis Ugama Islam Singapura 
 
Ministry of Education ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute 
Ministry of Education Science Centre 
Ministry of Education Institute of Technical Education 
Ministry of Information, 
Communication and the Arts 
National Heritage Board 
Ministry of Information, 
Communication and the Arts 
National Library Board  
Ministry of National Development Building and Construction Authority 
Ministry of National Development Agri-food and Veterinary Authority 
Ministry of the Environment PUB Chair 
 
 
 These agenices are niche agencies, addressing functions of the public service 
that are often highly specific. These agencies are routinely helmed by professionals 
who had been serving in the specific area throughout their entire career, and are not 
easily substitutable in another area.  
 
Table 41. Career Summaries of PSes representing the Professional Logic  
Name Career Summary Year PS 
Tan Gee Paw MEWR 1995 
Peter Ong Mincomm, MTI, PMO, GLC 2001 
Lim Soo Hoon MTI, MOM, PMO 2003 
Chan Lai Fung MOH, MOF, PMO, MTI 2005 
Tan Ching Yee MTI, MOE, MICA, MOE 2005 
Niam Chiang Meng MOF, MITA, MND, MTI 2005 
Chan Yeng Kit MOF, MTI, MINDEF, MOE, GLC 2007 
Ow Foong Pheng MND, MOF, MINDEF, MHA 2010 
Loh Khum Yean MINCOMM, MTI, PMO 2010 
Bilahari Kausikan MFA 2010 
Chan Heng Kee MINCOMM, MCD, PMO, MO 2011 
Chew Hock Yong MINCOMM, MHA, MOF, MCD, MOT 2016 





 This section also serves to demonstrate the possibility of an alternative 
argument, that the state bureaucracy does not have sufficient personnel to serve as the 
heads of the statutory boards. I show that, far from having a scarcity of personnel to 
serve, the state bureaucracy at the level below the permanent secretary actually has 
had sufficient numbers of deputy secretaries who could have either become heads of 





Table 42. Career Summaries of Long-Tenure DSes 
Name Tenure Career Summaries 
Ng Kiat Chong 1982-1995 Minlaw, MOM, MTI, MINCOMM, MND 
Lim Siam Kim 1983-2002 MHA, MITA, PMO 
Lee Chiong Giam 1983-2005 MCD, MFA 
Low Puk Yeong 1984-2006 MOH, MND, MEWR, MINDEF 
Wong Hoi Kit 1986-2001 MENV, MHA 
Dileep Nair 1987-1997 MOF, MINDEF 
Lim Hsiu Mei 1987-1999 MCD 
Pek Hock Thiam 1990-2001 MTI, MFA 
Ong Kok Min 1990-2003 PMO, Minlaw, MICA 
Pek Siok Ching 1991-2003 MOF, MOM 
Lim Soo Ping 1991-2003 MND, MHA, MCD, PMO 
Lau Wah Ming 1991-2009 MOE, MND, MINCOMM, Minlaw, PMO 
Ho Cheok Sun 1993-2007 MFA, MND, MINCOMM 
Khoo Teng Chye 1993-2010 MND, MINCOMM (PSA), PUB 
Chua Siew San 1995-2011 MFA, MINDEF 
Lim Hup Seng 1996-2009 MINDEF, PMO, MOF 
Willie Tan Yoke 
Meng 1996-2013  MND, PMO, MOH, MOM, MINDEF 
Tan Kee Yong 1998-  MINDEF, MND, MHA, Minlaw, MOE, PMO 
Choo Whatt Bin 1998-2008 MND, MICA, MTI, PMO, MOE 
Cheong-Chua Koo 
Hean 2002-  MND 




Goh Soon Poh 2002-  MTI, MOF, MCDS, PMO, MHA 
Ng Wai Choong 2003- MOF, MND, MTI 
Goh Aik Guan 2003- MOH, MTI 
Tay Kim Poh 2004- MND 
Choong May Ling 2004- MOE, MOF, MOH, MHA, MICA 
Yap Ong Heng 2004-2015 SAF, Minlaw, MOT 
Tan Eng Beng 2005- MOE, PMO, MOM, MND, Istana 
Andrew Tan 2005- MITA, MINDEF, PMO, MFA, MEWR, MND 
Lim Boon Wee 2005- MOF, MND, MOT, PMO, MOE 
Rosa Daniel 2006- MOF, PMO, MTI, MOE, MEWR 
 
 
 The existence of these long-tenure positions suggests that pure experience is 
not sufficient to arrive at the PS position or the chief executive for statutory boards, 
and that there is a preference for personnel in the military-security logic. Many of 
these DSes would have had experience in the fields that they are in charge of, and 
could have become leaders of the relevant statutory boards. However, that is not what 
we have seen for many of the important statutory boards. What has happened instead 
is the frequent entrance of a military leader directly into the top-leadership position of 

























5.5 Political logic 
 
 
 Here I show the evidence for the political logic in the state bureaucracy. 
Although the political logic operates throughout the public service, it is crystallised 
through the position of the Principal Private Secretary (PPS), where the PPS has to 
work constantly with the senior political figure. In so doing, the recruitment of PPS 
into politics reinforces the elitist and meritocratic view of political power.  
The PPS position is the assistant to the Prime Minister, the Senior Minister, 
and the Deputy Prime Ministers. The PPS-PM is usually for the bureaucrats who have 
been identified to become PSes, while the PPSes to SMs do not always become PSes. 
PPSes represent the political logic because of the close relationship they have with 
senior political figures. The PPS position is also unique for other reasons. It is one 
way in which senior public servants enter the political sphere, although certainly not 
the only way. Of the 2016 Parliament, there are 5 PPSes: Khaw Boon Wan, Heng 
Swee Keat, Lawrence Wong, Ong Ye Kung and Chee Hong Tat. 4 of them are in the 
Cabinet, while Chee Hong Tat is a Senior Minister of State as of June 2016.  
Some PPS officeholders in the past would go on to join ISD as the head of the 














 The table describes the background of Lee Kuan Yew's PPSes. The PPSes 
during his PMship all had a background in MINDEF. Lim Siong Guan had multiple 
contributions to MINDEF, being a director at the Youth Flying Club, setting up anti-
aircraft guns, being the general manager at in a defence industry company (the 
equivalent of a CEO today). Heng Swee Keat and Leo Yip both served in the 
Singapore Police Force before joining the Administrative Service. All but 2 of Lee 





Table 43. Backgrounds and Trajectories of PPS to Lee Kuan Yew (PM: 1965-1990) 
Name Year PPS PS? Military- 
Security 
Pre-PPS Post-PPS 
Lim Siong Guan* 1978-1981 1 1 MINDEF PS, Mindef 
Lam Chuan Leong 1981-1984 1 1 DS, MINDEF PS MTI 
Tan Guong Ching 1984-1987 1 0 Director, MHA PS, 
Mincomm 
Moses Lee 1987-1991 1 0 Director, MOE GM, SBA 
Ho Meng Kit 1991-1994 0 1 Director, 
MINDEF 
MD, EDB 
Alan Chan 1995-1997 1 0 Director, 
MINDEF 
DS, MFA 
Heng Swee Keat 1998-2000 1 1 Director, MOE DS,  MTI 
Leo Yip 2001-2002 1 1 SPF DS, MOM 




COL Lee Seow 
Hiang 
2004 - 2008 0 1 RSAF CEO, CAG 
Chee Hong Tat 2008-2010 1 0 Director, MOE CEO, EMA; 
2PS MTI 
*Lim Siong Guan became Head of Civil Service in 2000.  






 Goh Chok Tong's PPSes span his time as Deputy Prime Minister, to his tenure 
as Senior Minister. 2 PPSes have gone on to become the ISD Directors and later on, 
as PS. Khaw Boon Wan has since entered the Cabinet. Tan Jee Say has become a 






Table 44. Backgrounds and Trajectories of PPS to Goh Chok Tong (PM: 1965-1990) 
 Name Year PPS  PS Military-
Security 
Pre-PPS Post-PPS 
Tan Jee Say 1985-1990 0 0 DD, MTI Private Sector 
Chiang Chie 
Foo 





1992-1995 1 0 
 
CEO,SGH PS, MTI 
Tan Yong Soon 1995-1997 1 1 DS, MINDEF DS, MOF 
Tan Tee How 1998-2000 1 0 DS, MITA CEO, NHG 
Pang Kin 
Keong 
2000-2004 1 1 Director, MTI D, ISD 
Albert Chua 2004-2006 1 0 DS, MFA High 
Commissioner, 
MFA, PS MFA 
Augustin Lee 2007-2010 0 0 Director, MTI DS, MOM 
Italicised for those who entered politics 
Table 45. Backgrounds and Trajectories of PPS to Lee Hsien Loong (DPM: 1990-2004) 
Name Year PPS PS Military-
Security 
EDB Pre-PPS Post-PPS 
Liew Heng San 1991-5 1 0 Yes Director, PSC DS, 
Mincomm 
Choo Whatt Bin 1996-7 0 0 0 Director, MTI DS, MITA 







 Two of Lee Hsien Loong's PPSes have entered Cabinet - Ong Ye Kung and 
Lawrence Wong. None of his PPSes were uniformed officers in the military or police. 
 
 
Table 46. Percentage of PPSes (of Senior Political Figures) by 
Institutional Logics  



















23 8 (34.8) 0 15 (64.3) 
PPS to Lee 
Hsien 
Loong 
25 0 3 (12.0) 13 (52.0) 
 
 
The position of the Principal Private Secretary is usually followed by a stint at 
a major organisation. That the PPS to the PM ends up being the Permanent Secretary 
is also an indicator for how much the trust factor is valued together with competency 
and not strictly technical competency. That there are non-security PPSes to the PM 
illustrates that there are different paths to the PSship. Altogether, out of 28 personnel 
who were ever-PPS, 5 of them have entered politics. While there is uncertainty if this 
Goh Aik Guan 2000-2001 0 0 0 Director, MTI DS, MTI 
Ong Ye Kung 2002-5 Politics 0 0 Director, MTI CEO, WDA 
Lawrence Wong 2005-8 Politics 0 0 DD, MOH CEO, EMA 
Ng How Yue 2009-11 1 0 0 DS, Trade 2PS, MTI 
Gabriel Lim 2012-5 1 0 0 Director CEO, MDA 
Chng Kai Fong 2015- incumbent 0 0 Director, 
PMO 
 




constitutes a trend, this does indicate how PPSes can be influenced sufficiently 





Table 47. Table of Permanent Secretaries who entered Politics 
Name Year Entered 
Politics 
Previous Position Held 
Hon Sui Sen 1970 Chairman and President of 
DBS; Chairman of EDB; 
Permanent Secretary in the 
Ministry of Finance 
Howe Yoon Chong 1979 Head of Civil Service; 
Chairman and General 
Manager of Port of 
Singapore Authority; 
Permanent Secretary in the 
Ministry of National 
Development 
Tharman Shanmugaratnam 2001 Managing Director at the 




 The PPS is not the only position in the public service that is prone to enter 
politics. Other than Khaw Boon Wan, various permanent secretaries have gone on to 
enter politics. Hon Sui Sen, and Howe Yoon Chong joined politics. Tharman 
Shanmugaratnam was made the Managing Director for the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore before joining politics. The entry into politics is not solely restricted to the 
PPSes. PS-level staff have also done so.  
 Below the level of the PPS and PS, staffs at various levels of the bureaucracy 
have also entered politics, though they have not always made it to the Cabinet. Here, I 
have only focused on the top tiers – at the level of the PS, or at the level of the 
Cabinet. This continues to reinforce the meritocratic view of personnel selection in 





5.6 Logics in Interaction 
 
 
 The significant agencies tend to have a mix of leadership through their tenure. 
I discuss these agencies owing to their historic importance to the development of the 
Singapore state. I will discuss the Housing Development Board (HDB), Urban 
Redevelopment Authority (URA), the Central Provident Fund Board (CPFB), and the 
People's Association (PA).  
 The leadership histories of these agencies show influences from different 
logics. While these agencies are often dominated by the professional logic, other 
logics make their appearances from time to time. Some of these agencies appear to be 
temporary positions for prospective officeholders, such as Lim Hng Kiang and Lui 
Tuck Yew, both of whom spending a short time at HDB before moving to political 
office. The chairperson of CPFB on the other hand, has had people from the military-
security and political logics, suggesting that CPFB is politically important, which it is.  
 
 
Housing Development Board (HDB) and Urban Redevelopment Authority 
(URA) 
 





Au Eng Kok -1989 0 0 0 
Liu Thai Ker 1989-1993 0 0 0 
Khoo Teng Chye 1993-1996 0 0 0 
Dr Tan Kim Siew 1996-2000 1 0 0 
Tan Yong Soon 2000-2003 1 0 1 
Cheong-Chua Koon Hean 2003-2010 0 0 0 
Ng Lang 2010- 0 0 0 
 
                                                
30 Au Eng Kok and Khoo Teng Chye spent their time at HDB. Liu Thai Ker was an 
architect before joining HDB. Cheong-Chua Koon Hean was at URA and in the MND 









HDB was an important part of Singapore’s development - senior civil servant 
Ngiam Tong Dow described CPF, HDB and EDB as the central pillars for nation-
building. HDB embarked on a homeownership program that gave Singaporeans a 
stake in the new country.  
 
 “Those of us who grew up after the war in the 1950s will recall the festering 
urban slums of Chinatown and the mosquito-ridden kampongs of Toa Payoh. 
So when our families moved into high-rise HDB flats from the mid-1960s 
onwards, it was like paradise on Earth. The EDB worked in tandem with the 
HDB. The EDB found the jobs, and the HDB built flats at the rate of one flat 
every 36 mins. It was a winning combination underpinning the electoral 
success of the PAP at every generation since. Jobs and housing secured the 
mandate of heaven for the PAP led by Lee Kuan Yew.” (Ngiam, 2006: p. 153-
154) 
 
                                                
31 Moh Siew Meng, Tan Guong Ching, Peter Chan Jer Hing, and Niam Chiang Meng  
were Permanent Secretaries before becoming HDB CEOs. Tay Kim Poh spent much 
of his career at HDB. Niam Chiang Meng was in the Administrative Service.  
Table 49. Housing Development Board Executives'31 tenures by Institutional Logics 
Name Years Military-
Security 
EDB PPS Pre-CEO Post-CEO 
Liu Thai Ker -1988 0 0 0 Private 
practice 
CEO, URA 




Lim Hng Kiang 1991 1 0 0 SAF Politics 
Moh Siew Meng 1991-1995 0 0 0 PS, MOM PS 
Tan Guong Ching 1995-1999 0 0 1 PS, MEWR PS, MHA 
Peter Chan Jer Hing 1999-2001 1 0 0 PS, MHA PS, MND 
Niam Chiang Meng 2001-2005 0 0 0 PS, MICA PS, MCD 
Lui Tuck Yew 2005-2006 1 0 0 CNV Politics 
Tay Kim Poh 2006-2009 0 0 0 HDB DS MND 
Cheong-Chua Koon 
Hean 




Apart from the HDB, URA also contributed to the project of land 
development. However, HDB and URA had a technical focus in selecting its 
leadership although some of its leaders were from the administrative service.  
While HDB and URA are technical agencies that rely on experts, there are leaders 
that are part of the administrative service.  
In contrast to the leaders of military and economic agencies, leaders in 
infrastructure are not rotated through other agencies, instead rising through their 
organisation to become senior leaders, and sometimes to the top executive position. 
This brings us to the point that managerial capacity and technical knowledge are not 
sufficient in themselves in contributing to help individuals ascend to higher leadership 
positions. Even though they operate in the sensitive area of housing, they are not 
involved in the major decision-making around housing policies.  
HDB chief executives thus represent the professional logics, with the position 
designated as a PS-grade position until 2005, when Lui Tuck Yew became the CEO. 
Subsequent CEOs have not been made PSes yet. 
Although the HDB has had two CEOs originating from the military, their 
tenures have been short, in what appeared to be holding positions before taking 
political office.  
The executive successions of URA chief executives largely reflect the 
professional logic, although Dr Tan Kim Siew and Tan Yong Soon contribute to the 




















                                                
32 The chairpersons were all senior permanent secretaries, including two Heads of 
Civil Service: Lim Siong Guan and Dr Andrew Chew. Han Cheng Fong was a PS at 
the Ministry of Labour, while Tan Chok Kian was a long-time PS in several 
ministries.  
Table 50. Percentage of HDB and URA Executives' Tenures (in person-years) by 
Institutional Logics 
















28 4 (14.3) 0 4 (14.3) 
URA 
Executive 
27 7 (25.9) 0 3 (11.1) 





Han Cheng Fong -1980 0 0 0 
Tan Chok Kian 1981-1984/5/6 0 0 0 
Lim Siong Guan 1985/6-1994 1 0 1 
Dr Andrew Chew 1994-1998 0 0 0 
Ngiam Tong Dow 1998-2001 0 1 0 
Moses Lee Kim Poo 2001-2002 1 0 0 
Koh Yong Guan 2002-2013 0 0 0 






CPF's chairpersons' succession shows the importance of the professional and 
the military-security logic. Senior civil servants have held the position of CPF chair, 
while the chief executives were usually professional bureaucrats. The CPF 
chairperson is usually someone representing the professional or the military-security 
institutional logics.  
CPF is an important agency, responsible for managing the retirement funds for 
members. The CPF contribution rate is important both politically and economically as 
it contributes to the cost of labour in Singapore, and hence wage competitiveness. The 
leadership for the CPF must thus maintain a close relationship with the political 
establishment. All of the chairpersons for CPF are senior permanent secretaries, while 
the senior executives are bureaucrats who have had exposure to politicians before.  
                                                
33 Robert Iau was in a government-linked company. Lim Han Soon was at the 
Monetary Authority of Singapore. Willie Tan was a SAFOS recipient. Yee Ping Yi 
was from the Administrative Service.  




EDB PPS Pre-CEO Post-
CEO 
Robert Iau -1980 0 0 0 GLC Retired 




Tan Yoke Meng 
Willie 








Liew Heng San 2004-2009 0 0 1 PS Law Retired 








The CPF chair is usually a senior PS, such as Lim Siong Guan, Dr Andrew 
Chew and Ngiam Tong Dow. Moses Lee and Chiang Chie Foo were the Principal 
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister at different points.  
Overall, the chairpersons’ successions show the influence of the military-
security logic whereas the executive’s succession shows the influence of the 











Lim Chin Teong -1986 0 0 0 
Lee Chiong Giam 1986-1999 0 0 0 
Ong Keng Yong 1999-2003 0 0 0 
Tan Boon Huat 2003-2010 0 0 0 
Yam Ah Mee 2010-2013 1 0 0 
Ang Hak Seng 2013-2016 1 0 0 
 
                                                
34 Lim Chin Teong spent his career at PA. Tan Boon Huat a career civil servant. Lee 
Chiong Giam and Ong Keng Yong were Deputy Secretaries at the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, and both were ambassadors to different countries. Ong Keng Yong was also 
one-time press secretary to Lee Kuan Yew.  
Table 53. Percentage of CPF Chairpersons and Executives Tenures (in person-
years) by Institutional Logics 
Name Number of 
person-years 
in the study 













36 11 (30.1) 3 (8.33) 11 (30.1) 
CPF 
Executive 




The People’s Association is concerned with social cohesion. It was founded in 
1960 after a period of racial and religious tension in the 50s. The People’s Association 
is important as the umbrella for grassroots activity in Singapore, connecting 
politicians with the citizens. In this role it is politically important, and the chairperson 
of PA is the Prime Minister. However the chief executives reflect the influence of the 
professional logics, although recent CEOs – Yam Ah Mee and Ang Hak Seng reflect 
influence from the military-security logic. Yam Ah Mee was an Air Force general, 
while Ang Hak Seng was senior police officer. While the chief executives of PA 
presumably have to be interested in community work, they are not grassroots 
organisers in themselves. That grassroots organisers are not selected to become the 





Table 55. Percentage of People's Association Executives' Tenures (in person-
years) by Institutional Logics 
 








Number of  
PPS-years 















In this section, I look at the influence of the military-security logic when state 
agencies undergo large changes in their organisation. The kinds of leaders selected for 
the organisation during creation and restructuring can further reinforce the status of 
the institutional logics.  
 The appointment of the personnel selected during organisational changes 
reflects the influence of the institutional logic at that point in time, or a change in the 
logics influencing the policy domain of the organisation.  
The Singapore bureaucracy has been a dynamic one. Organisations continue to 
be restructured or re-formed from existing organisations. They are given new 
purposes, or new mandates. For example, I had discussed earlier the transformation of 
the NSTB into A*STAR. The broad purpose of promoting and aligning scientific and 
technological research with economic development has remained the same across the 
transition, but the manner this was done had changed. A new focus of promoting 
biomedical research was added on top of its existing emphasis on engineering-related 
research. Philip Yeo, who championed the biomedical research initiative, became the 
new chairman of the A*STAR. Philip Yeo himself has had a long track record of 
pushing new economic developmental projects, driving much of this while he was 
chair and co-chair of the Economic Development Board. Prior to his appointments at 
EDB, he was also at one point the chair of the Singapore Technologies Holdings, the 
entity for many of the military industry companies.  
Other technological projects show how people from the military or from PPS 
roles eventually become leaders of new organisations and projects. Yong Ying-I was 
a PPS to Lee Hsien Loong while he was still a DPM. She later became the CEO of the 





Table 56. Selected Instances of Organisational Change  
Agency Change Nature of Change Leadership 
Economic Development 
Board 
EDB + Strategic 
Business Units 
Formation of SBUs 
to undertake efforts 




Philip Yeo  
 
MDship of Dr Tan 
Chin Nam 






















transport areas of 
different units were 
combined into a 
single entity 
 
Liew Heng San 
(PPS, MD-EDB) 




PUB split into two 
bodies to look at 
water issues and 
energy issues 
separately. PUB 
became a statutory 





remained in the 
Ministry of Trade 
and Industry 
 
PUB chief: Khoo 
Teng Chye 
 
EMA CEO: Khoo 
Chin Hean 
Singapore Institute for 
Standards and Industrial 
Research, National 
Productivity Board 
SPRING The new entity 
focused on how to 
enhance productivity 
and to improve the 
small and medium 
businesses 
 





The regulatory arm 
of PSA and the other 
related arms in the 
Ministry of 
Chen Tze Penn35 
                                                
35 Although Chen Tze Penn is part of the Administrative Service, he has spent a large 





were consolidated to 
form the Maritime 
Port Authority.  
 
Department of Public 
Cleanliness in the 





corporatised into the 
National 
Environment Agency 
with a wider scope 














WDA was formed to 
improve post-
education training 
and to encourage 
lifelong learning. 
WDA was also 








Creation of the 
F1 Project Office 
To deal with the 
implementation of 
the F1 Singapore 
Grand Prix 
 
Lim Neo Chian 
(SAF, BG) 


























To reflect the 
technological 
convergence, to 





CEO: Yong Ying-I 








TDB to focus more 
on trade promotion 
 


















Lim Chuan Poh was also appointed the chairperson of A*STAR, the successor 
agency to NSTB, and the successor to Philip Yeo in that position.  
Lim Neo Chian was appointed Chairman of JTC and later on became the 
executive deputy chairman of STB. Under Lim’s helm, STB embarked on several 
watershed projects, such as the approval for the Integrated Resorts despite a long-time 
ban on casinos, and the decision to host an F1 leg in Singapore. This required the 
creation of new capacities for the organisation, and increased coordination with other 
government agencies.  
Leo Yip was the founding CEO of the Workforce Development Agency, and 
was later succeeded by Ong Ye Kung, and then by Chan Heng Kee. Both Yip and 
Chan have both become Permanent Secretaries, while Ong is now a Cabinet Minister. 
In this instance, both Yip and Ong were both PPS, but to different persons. Ong was 
the PPS to Lee Hsien Loong as he transited into the Prime Ministership from 2003 to 
2005. Yip was a PPS to then-SM Lee Kuan Yew. Yip himself was also a former 
police officer, and was awarded the SPFOS in 1982. 
 These limited examples show the overall influence of the military-security 
logic, in influencing executive appointments during periods of organisational changes. 
The political logic is also represented in several instances. Less represented are the 
professional logic. It appears that a few individuals representing the military-security 







 This section aims to recapitulate the main themes of this thesis, and suggest 
paths for future research.  
 This thesis has been about the institutional logics in the Singapore state and in 
politics. I have looked at the historical developments of the institutional orders in the 
Singapore state. They are: the economy, the military, the politics - in particular the 
People's Action Party, and the state bureaucracy. I argued that the military-security 
logic is dominant owing to the emphasis on physical vulnerability especially during 
the years immediately after independence. The keen sense of vulnerability was felt by 
the initial generation of political leaders and bureaucrats, and this has been 
institutionalised in politics across multiple generations of political leaders. This thesis 
investigates one avenue of its manifestation, and it is through the executive 
successions in the state bureaucracy and in politics. The significant presence of 
former military, intelligence and police personnel is evidence for the presence of the 
military-security logic in the Singapore state.  
 I have examined the analytical frameworks relevant to this thesis - looking at 
both new institutionalism and institutional logics. I argued that the new 
institutionalism was inappropriate for this thesis, owing to the lack of isomorphism 
observed amongst the different agencies. Rather, I turn to institutional logics as a 
better framework to explain the patterns of executive succession in the Singapore state 
bureaucracy and in politics.  
 An isomorphic view of the Singapore state agencies should see organisations 
take on more military-like attributes. Such attitudes could a greater emphasis on rank 




Isomorphism should also see organisations come to resemble the military in terms of 
organisation structure. The use of military officers could also diffuse to the extent that 
most agencies would have a military officer as the chief executive. These has not 
happened. The mimetic approach to the Singapore state bureaucracies does not apply 
sufficiently. The new institutional approach remains parochial in the sense of how it 
ignores wider societal dynamics and focuses narrowly on the organisational field of 
organisations. This is where the explanatory power of institutional logics is much 
greater than that of the new institutionalist frameworks. Rather than locating 
organisational practices in the institutions of organisational fields, the framework for 
institutional logics locates organisational practices within the existing institutional 
orders - of politics, capitalist economy, and the professional institutions, among 
others. I have therefore used institutional logics to explain the pattern of executive 
succession in the major parts of the Singapore state bureaucracy and in politics.  
 The array of institutional logics employed by the literature on institutional 
logics had to be modified. Friendland and Alford introduced several institutional 
orders: “the market, the bureaucratic state, democracy, the nuclear family, and 
Christian religion.”  (Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury, 2012: 54; Friedland and 
Alford, 1991) Thornton and others added to this the community, and merged together 
democracy with the bureaucratic state. I have noticed how the institutional orders 
suggested by Friedland and Alford, and Thornton and others are limiting in the sense 
that they reflect the democratic capitalist countries in which they are situated. For 
institutional logics to be relevant to different parts of the world, the labels for the 
institutional orders need to be adjusted or re-labelled for use in other parts of the 
world where democracy and capitalism apply differently. With the case in Singapore, 




logic, and explored how Singapore society – as disciplined as it is – seems to reflect 
some attributes of that military-security logic.  
 I also outlined how Singapore is not an exception in Asia when it comes to the 
dominance of the military in the state. Countries such as South Korea and Taiwan, 
which also underwent rapid economic development, also saw an influential military 
institutional order in their societies. Things have undoubtedly changed since 
democratic rule. Economic prosperity has meant that geopolitical survival via military 
force is no longer as salient as before.  
 Using executive succession as a technique, I made arguments about how 
politically important state agencies are influenced by the military-security logic. I 
described in detail how military officers are routinely rotated to civilian postings in 
the state bureaucracy. The Army, Air Force, and Navy chiefs routinely rotate to the 
bureaucracy or even to politics. This is not restricted to the top positions in the SAF; 
other senior military officials also rotate to the civilian bureaucracy. The second 
evidence for this is how military officers also rotate to the economic agencies. I show 
how the chairpersons of the Economic Development Board (EDB) and the Agency for 
Science, Technology and Research (A*STAR) have been senior military personnel or 
related to the military bureaucracy. EDB is especially significant, given how it 
remains the chief economic agency in attracting promotions and being the main body 
that coordinates industry planning in Singapore.  
 I showed that the military-security logic influences other important 
government agencies outside of the economic sphere. I showed that the Central 
Provident Fund (CPF), Land Transport Authority (LTA), and to a limited extent, the 
Public Utilities Board (PUB) are also influenced by the military-security logic via 




organisations that are politically sensitive (CPF), have strategic functions crucial to 
the viability of Singapore (PUB and water source), or deal with large-scale 
infrastructure (LTA).  
 There is still an economic logic present, and is visible through the pattern of 
executive and chairperson successions in the other economic agencies. The economic 
logic in the state bureaucracy is interested in promoting economic development in 
Singapore, and the lead organisation in this is the EDB. EDB officers rotate outwards 
and become the chief executive in other economic agencies, even if they do not end 
up heading the EDB itself. I showed several examples, and I will repeat just two here: 
Manohar Khiatani was from EDB and became JTC CEO; Lee Yi Shyan would 
become CEO of IE Singapore and become a politician.  
I also showed how a political logic exists in the state bureaucracy, where 
permanent secretaries leave the public service and become politicians. The political 
logic is closely to the PAP’s governing ideology of multiracialism, incorruptibility 
and meritocracy rule. The meritocratic system in Singapore overlaps with elitism in 
Singapore. There are several ways that the political logic is visible in the executive 
successions in the state bureaucracy, and they both have to do with the entry of public 
servants into politics. Permanent Secretaries have entered the political sphere on 
several occasions; there also exists the position of the Principal Private Secretary to 
senior political figures (Deputy Prime Minister and onwards), and that has become a 
route through which potentially minister-level candidates are selected. On the other 
hand, the PAP grassroots is not where Cabinet candidates are recruited.  
Then, there is the professional logic. In the state bureaucracy, they are the 
career bureaucrats who have risen up in the bureaucracy, and have usually gone 




Finance. Less common is the specialisation route – serving continuously either in 
infrastructure or in foreign affairs. The presence of the professional logic, especially 
in long-serving deputy secretaries illustrates the point that there is no lack of 
experienced personnel who could presumably become Permanent Secretaries or as 
chairpersons in a major statutory board. It is not that there is a shortage of people who 
are able to serve as heads of state agencies, but that the issue could be one of 
preference for officers representing the military-security order.  
 I showed how the restructuring and creation of new agencies further reinforce 
the evidence for the dominance of the military-security logic. When new 
organisations are created, members representing the military-security logic often 
become the heads of the restructured or created agencies.  
 This thesis makes contributions to several areas of literature. This thesis is an 
instance of the application of the institutional logics framework. The modifications 
here to the political logic and the addition of the military order should allow the 
framework to be applicable to a wider variety of territories and histories.  
The second area of contribution is to the literature on the Singapore state. 
While there have much commentary on the Singapore state and on the politics in 
Singapore, few studies have looked at the flow of personnel from one domain to 
another. This thesis contributes to the Singapore literature by describing in detail, the 
flows of personnel from the military to the civilian bureaucracy, and using that as 
evidence for the existence of the military-security logic. While the framing of 
Singapore as a disciplined society is not new per se, this thesis has advanced the 
theme in providing empirical evidence for how the theme could find expression 




 There are several directions for how future research could proceed. There are 
at least three paths. The first branch could consider if the institutional orders require 
further modification, and the grounds for their modifications. The second branch 
involves the validation of the military logic across several countries, and across 
different parts of the world. It could prove fruitful to consider the depth of the military 
logic in Singapore and how it compares with other countries, and the ways in which 
such logics are entrenched or retrenched in their respective societies. The third branch 
involves further investigation into the logics in Singapore.  One could investigate the 
theme of discipline in Singapore and how it has changed over the years. One could 
also investigate other institutional logics in Singapore society.  
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Careers of Senior Civil Servants: Lim Siong Guan, Ngiam Tong Dow, J Y Pillay, 




Selected Significant Appointments 
 
Lim Siong Guan First Permanent Secretary (Jul 1981-1992) and later Permanent 
Secretary for Defence (1993-May 1994), Principal Private 
Secretary to the Prime Minister (May 1978-Jul 1981), Second 
Permanent Secretary of the Public Service Division, Prime 
Minister's Office (PMO) (Jun-Oct 1994); Permanent Secretary 
of PMO (Oct 1994-Jul 1998); Head of Civil Service (Sep 1999-
Apr 2005), Chairman (Jun 1994-Mar 1995) of Singapore 
Technologies Holdings, Permanent Secretary for Education 
(Apr 1997-Jun 1999); Second PS for Finance (Aug 1998-May 
1999); Permanent Secretary for Finance (Jun 1999-Sep 2006); 
Permanent Secretary (Special Duties) in PMO (Sep 1999-Apr 
2005); Deputy Chairman (Feb-Sep 2006) and later Chairman 
(Oct 2006-June 2009) of Economic Development Board; 





J Y Pillay 1961: Joins the Ministry of Finance in Singapore, and becomes 
deputy secretary of the Economic Planning Unit 
1968: Appointed acting permanent secretary, Ministry of 
Finance 
1971: Appointed chairman, Malaysia-Singapore Airlines 
1972–1996: Chairman, Singapore Airlines 
1972: Appointed permanent secretary, Ministry of Finance, 
Revenue Division 
1978: Meritorious Service Medal 
1974–1986: Chairman, Temasek Holdings 
1979–1985: Chairman, Development Bank of Singapore 
1979–1996: Director, Singapore Symphony Orchestra 
1985–1989: Managing director, Monetary Authority of 
Singapore and Government of Singapore Investment 
Corporation 
1989–30 Mar 1995: Permanent secretary, Ministry of National 
Development 
1991–1994: Chairman, Singapore Technologies Holdings and 
Neptune Orient Lines 
Ngiam Tong 
Dow 
Permanent Secretary at Ministry of Communications (1971-
1972); Ministry of Finance (1972-1979, Jan 1987-1999); 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (1979-1986), Prime Minister's 
Office (1979-1994), and Ministry of National Development 
(Feb 1987-1989); Chairman of Singapore Telephone Board 
(1972), Economic Development Board (1975-1981), Sheng-Li 
Holding Company Pte Ltd (1981-1991), Development Bank of 




Philip Yeo Liat 
Kok 
Acting (1979) and later, Second Permanent Secretary for 
Defence (1980-1985); Chairman of Singapore Computer 
Systems (1981-1982); Chairman of National Computer Board 
(1981-1987), Chairman (Jan 1986-Jan 2001) and Co-Chairman 
(Feb 2001-Jan 2006) of Economic Development Board; 
Chairman of Sembawang Corporation (1994-1998), SembCorp 
Industries (1998-1999), Pidemco Land (1999-2000) and 
CapitaLand (Nov 2000-Apr 2004); Member (1980) and 
Chairman of Singapore Technologies Holdings (1987-1993); 
Deputy Chairman (1999) and later, Chairman of National 
Science and Technology Board and later, the Agency for 
Science, Technology and Research or A*STAR (Feb 2001-Mar 
2007); Chairman of Standards, Productivity and Innovation 
Board (Apr 2007-to date) 
Lim Neo Chian 1993-1995, Chief of Army; 1996-2003 CEO, Deputy 
Chairman, and later on Chairman of JTC; 2003-2009 Deputy 
Chairman and CEO of STB 
Lim Chuan Poh 1998-2000 Chief of Army; 2000-2003 Chief of Defence Force; 
2003-2007 PS MOE; 2007-present Chairman A*STAR 
Ho Meng Kit pre-1991 Navy; 1991-1994 PPS to Senior Minister Lee Kuan 
Yew; 1994-1996 DS MITA; 1996-1998 MD EDB; DS MTI; 
2003-2005 CEO LTA;2004-2007  DS MICA; 2007-2011 DS 
MFA 
Ng Chee Khern 1984-2006 RSAF, 2006-2009 Chief of Air Force; 2010-2014 






APPENDIX 2: SELECTED ORGANISATIONAL CHANGES 
 
National Computer Board 
 
The National Computer Board was initially formed under the Ministry of Finance in 
1981. NCB was then transferred to MTI in 1997, and then to the Ministry of 
Communications, which was renamed Ministry of Communications & Information 
Technology in June 1999. In December 1999, NCB merged with the 
Telecommunications Authority of Singapore to form IDA. In 2001, IDA was moved 
to the Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts. In 2013, a new ministry 
was formed from the restructuring of MCYS and MICA, and one of the resulting 
ministries was named the Ministry of Communications and Information, with IDA 
being one of the constituent statutory boards. In 2016, IDA and the Media 
Development Authority restructured to form the Infocommunications and Media 




Table 1. Summary of organisational changes at the National Computer Board/IDA 
Year Event 
1981 National Computer Board formed under Ministry of Finance 
1997 NCB moved to the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
1999 NCB moved to Ministry of Communications and renamed Ministry of 
Communications and Information Technology  
 
NCB was also renamed IDA after merger with TAS 
2001 IDA moved to MITA, renamed as MICA after the transfer.  
2013 IDA comes under a restructured MCI.  
2016 IDA and MDA restructured to form IMDA and Government 
Technology Agency, both under MCI.  
 
 
2013 Ministry Restructure 
 
In 2013, two ministries were restructured to form three ministries. Very broadly, the 
Ministries of Community, Youth and Sports (MCYS) and the Ministry of 
Information, Communications and the Arts (MICA) were restructured to form three 
ministries: Ministry of Social and Family Development (MSF), the Ministry of 
Culture, Community and Youth (MCCY) and Ministry of Communications and 
Information *(MCI). The table below shows the transfer of the statutory boards as a 
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and the Arts 
(MICA)  
National Arts Council National Heritage Board 
National Heritage Board National Arts Council 















The Community Ministries 
 
There were two ministries that focused on community development. They were the 
Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Social Affairs. One could argue that the 
present-day MCCY and MSF are just the present incarnations of the initial ministries 





In 1965, the Ministry of Culture (which had existed prior) was merged with the 
Ministry of Social Affairs to form the Ministry of Culture and Social Affairs. This 
lasted till 1968.  
 
In 1985, they merged again, to form the Ministry of Community Development. At the 
same time, the Information Division was formed at the Ministry of Communications 
to form the Ministry of Communications and Information (not the 2013 ministry of 
the same name). This “MCI” consisted of the current transportation domains, as well 
as the telecommunications and telephone services. In 1990, the Information-related 
services, together with the cultural elements of MCD, were transferred to a new 
ministry, called the Ministry of Information and the Arts. In 2001, MITA incorporated 
IDA from MCIT and renamed, Ministry of Information, Communication and the Arts 
(MICA). This remained until the 2013 changes.  
 
 
Workforce Development Agency 
 
The Workforce Development Agency was a restructuring of the Manpower 
Development Unit in the Ministry of Manpower.  
 
National Environment Agency 
 
The National Environment Agency was formed from the Public Health Division of 







APPENDIX 3: List of President’s Scholarship, SAFOS, and SPFOS recipients 
 
 
Year awarded Name President SAFOS SPFOS 
1966 Koh cher siang 1 
  1967 Mah bow tan 1 
  1967 Eddie Teo 1 
  1967 Su Guaning 1 
  1967 Lam Chuan Leong 1 
  1967 Peter Chan 1 
  1967 Kishore 1 
  1968 Tan Chin Nam 1 
  1971 Khoo Teng Chye 1 
  1971 Tjong Yik Min 1 
  1971 Low Sin Leng 1 
  1971 Lee Hsien Loong 1 1 
 1971 Liu Tsun Kie 1 1 
 1971 Boey Tak Hap 1 
 1971 Lai Seck Hui 
 
1 
 1972 Alan Chan 1 
  1972 Chua Chin Kiat 1 1 
 1972 Goh Liang Kwang 1 1 
 1972 Ho Ching 1 
  1972 Lim Neo Chian 1 
 1972 Wesley D'Aranjo 1 
 1972 Pek Beng Choon 1 
 1973 Chong Tow Chong 
  1973 Teo Chee Hean 1 1 
 1973 George Yeo 1 1 
 1973 Han Eng Juan 1 
 1973 Peter Ho 
 
1 
 1973 Khoo Boon Hui 1 
 1973 Lim Hng Kiang 1 
 1973 Lim Swee Say 1 
 1973 Tan Kim Siew 1 
 1974 Ko Kheng Hwa 1 
  1974 David Lim 1 
  1974 Bey Soo Khiang 1 
 1974 Willie Tan Yoke Meng 1 
 1974 Tan Yong Soon 1 
 1975 Chan Soo Sen 1 







1976 Lee Hsien Yang 1 1 
 1977 Rocky Lim 
 
1 
 1980 Vivian B 1 
  1981 Lee Yuen Hee 1 
  1979 Yap Ong Heng 1 1 
 1980 Lim Chuan Poh 1 
 1980 Lui Tuck Yew 1 
 1980 Ng Yat Chung 1 
 1980 Heng Chee How 
 
1 
1980 Heng Swee Keat 
 
1 
1980 Raymond Khoo 
 
1 
1981 Chang Hwee Nee 1 
  1981 Lu Cheng Yang 1 
 1982 Jek Kian Yee 1 1 
 1982 Chee Wee Kiong 1 
 1982 Desmond Kuek 1 
 1982 Lim Boon Wee 1 
 1982 Ronnie Tay 
 
1 
 1982 Tay Lim Heng 1 
 1982 Soh Wai Wah 
 
1 
1982 Leo Yip 
  
1 
1983 Sim Gum Guan 1 
 1983 Soh Kee Hean 
 
1 
1984 Reginald Hugh Lim 1 
 1984 Ng Chee Khern 1 1 
 1984 Loh Wai Keong 1 1 
 1985 Tan Kai Hoe 1 1 
 1985 Neo Kian Hong 1 
 1985 Tan Yih San 
 
1 
 1985 Ng Joo Hee 
  
1 
1986 Gary Ang 1 1 
 1986 Tan Meng Dui 1 
 1986 Lock Wai Han 
 
1 
1987 Chew Men Leong 1 
 1987 Jerry See 
  
1 
1988 Chan Chun Sing 1 1 
 1988 Ngien Hoon Ping 1 
 1989 Ng Chee Peng 1 1 
 1989 Lee Seow Hiang 1 1 
 1989 Tan Chuan Jin 1 
 1989 Aubeck Kam 
  
1 
1991 Perry Lim 1 1 
 1991 Lim Tuan Liang 1 





1994 Ong Tze Ch'in 1 1 
 1994 Sim Ann 1 
  1994 Melvyn Ong 
 
1 
 1994 Lau Peet Meng 
 
1 
 
